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Simon Johnson 
Amid all the bad economic news from Eastern Europe in the past two years, 
there has been at least one consistent source of optimism-the  rapid develop- 
ment of the private sector in some parts of  some countries. But it remains far 
from clear whether this development will be fast or deep enough to carry these 
economies out of their recessions soon. It is also not fully clear why the private 
sector has developed faster in some places than in others. 
The policy issues are important. Is there anything that a post-Communist 
government can do to speed up private-sector growth? Is there one type or path 
of  economic reform that particularly stimulates the private sector?’ Even in 
those countries where the private sector is relatively strong, can it provide the 
basis for a modem, industrial economy? These are important questions not 
only in Eastern Europe but also now in the former Soviet Union.2 
This paper makes three main points that address these issues. First, compar- 
ative evidence reveals that the private sector is weak in the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic (CSFR) and much stronger in Hungary and Poland. Second, 
The methodology used in the interviews reported here was developed with Piotr Strzalkowski 
and is part of a continuing project with him. His associates at MCR Research supervised both the 
interviews and the collection of information from other East European countries. Without their 
creative and inspired participation, this paper would not have been possible. The author would 
also like to thank three research assistants who very ably helped him  collect and interpret data: 
Lloyd Melnick,  Sapan Parekh, and Erik Whitlock. Helpful comments were provided by  Peter 
Rutland, Kalman Mizsei, and Pawel Dobrowolski. The National Bureau of Economic Research 
generously financed the collection of cross-country survey information. Interviews with businesses 
in Poland were paid for with funds provided by the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University. 
1. One of the arguments used in support of the “Chinese path’ is that it helps nonstate enterprise 
to develop (McMillan and Naughton  1992, 4-6)  and that this forces the state sector to become 
more competitive. 
2. This paper will deal explicitly only with Eastern Europe. For an analysis of the emerging 
nonstate forms of enterprise in various parts of the former Soviet Union, see Johnson and Islamov 
(1991) and Johnson and Kroll(1991, 1993) and the references given there. 
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current government policies targeted at the private sector in all three countries 
are too similar to explain the difference in private-sector strength. Changes in 
taxes, credit conditions, and property reform have all proceeded along similar 
lines, yet the outcome in terms of private-sector performance has been quite 
different.  Third,  the  most  plausible  explanation  for  differences  in  post- 
Communist private-sector performance lies with the different reform policies 
pursued by respective Communist regimes during their rule. 
Continued private-sector  growth is  not  surprising in Hungary, where  the 
Communist regime allowed private-sector development on and off since 1968 
and fairly consistently during the 1980s. However, economic reform in Poland 
is usually considered to have begun relatively recently, and the relative strength 
of its private sector needs further explanation. Therefore, I also provide more 
detailed evidence on the development of  the Polish private sector, including 
the results of interviews conducted with a sample of private businesspeople in 
December 1991. In my assessment, the Polish entrepreneurs who have done 
well are those able to take advantage of the way in which economic reforms 
were sequenced from 198  1 to 199  1. 
There is not a great deal of existing literature on the private sector of Eastern 
Europe. An excellent comprehensive survey of the private sector in East Ger- 
many and Poland up to the early 1980s is provided by  Aslund  (1983, and 
Seleny (1991) reviews the development of private business in Hungary, with 
particular emphasis on the 1980s. A number of papers have been written re- 
cently on the general situation of the private sector and the policies needed to 
stimulate its development, but most of  these are general and do not contain 
much concrete detail.  Important  exceptions include an  excellent review of 
the problems in the CSFR by Rondinelli (1991) and an interesting survey by 
Brandsma (199 1).  There are also some useful overview papers on the recent 
development of  small business in the CSFR (McDermott and Mejstrik  1992; 
Capek 1990), Hungary (Hare and Grosfeld 1991; Galasi and Sziraczki, n.d.), 
and Poland (Piasecki 1991; Grabowski 1991; and Grabowski and Kulawczuk 
199  1  b). 
There has been surprisingly little empirical work based on interviews with 
entrepreneurs. At least one random-sample  survey of private firms has been 
conducted in Gdansk, Poland (Grabowski and Kulawczuk 1991a), and an anal- 
ysis of rural entrepreneurship in Hungary is available, based on data from the 
1970s and early 1980s (Szelenyi  1988). Other studies have examined small, 
unrepresentative samples-such  as interesting networks of private firms (see, 
e.g., Johnson and Loveman 1993). A World Bank comparative study of private 
manufacturing in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland has also been announced, 
but its results are not yet available. 
The remainder of this paper develops the three main points outlined above. 
Section 16.1 discusses the generic situation of the private sector under commu- 
nism in Eastern Europe, and section  16.2 examines the available data on the 
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past two years. Section 16.3 describes both the methodology and the results of 
our interview-based field research. Section 16.4 concludes with the important 
lessons. There is also an appendix that explains in more detail how our sample 
of Polish private entrepreneurs was selected. 
16.1  The Private Sector under Communism 
The story of the private sector under communism can be quickly told, in 
part because there is not much to say and in part because other authors have 
covered this ground  thoroughly. This section provides  information  on how 
Communist regimes limited private activity because this is important for un- 
derstanding the current situation of the East European private sector. 
There were brief periods in which some Communist regimes tolerated a 
vibrant private sector, most notably during the New Economic Policy of  the 
1920s in the Soviet Union (Ball 1987; Kaufman 1962). There were also epi- 
sodes of relative liberalization for private business, although these were usually 
followed by a crackdown. Perhaps the best example is Poland, where controls 
on private business were loosened in the immediate aftermath of various politi- 
cal crises-1956-57,  1965-68,  1977-80,  and after 1982 (Aslund 1985, chap. 
2). These cycles of  policy reflected the tension between Communist ideol- 
ogy-which  was opposed to any private-sector activity-and  Communist gov- 
ernments’ desire to maintain an adequate supply of goods and services. This 
same tension helps explain why there was frequently tolerance of so-called 
private plots  in agriculture but  also repeated  clampdowns  on this activity.3 
Communist regimes altered their economic policy toward the private sector in 
line with their current political policies. They had almost total control over 
their societies, and to crush the private sector they could use policy instruments 
that ranged from violent repression to altering tax rates. The simplest and most 
common policy was to declare most or all private activity illegal. 
Even when legal, private business faced many constraints. Among the most 
significant were the difficulties associated with obtaining material inputs. In- 
dustrial supplies were hard to get, and the most desirable supplies were tightly 
controlled by state planning and supply agencies. Any private manufacturing 
operation, such as existed in the Polish handicrafts sector, relied on the state 
for its inputs and was therefore always vulnerable to a change in the political 
mood. In many cases, there were also restrictions on the use of  labor by the 
private sector, usually in the form of statutory limits on the maximum number 
of employees in a private firm. 
There were usually onerous taxes on private business. Tax rates were both 
high and unstable-it  was hard to forecast future private-sector tax liability. In 
3. The only significant private activity that remained in Eastern Europe by the 1970s was Polish 
agriculture, which was primarily private. However, both its supplies and its products were tightly 
controlled by  state trading agencies. 248  Simon Johnson 
some instances, important  details of the tax regulations  were not published, 
and  local  tax  offices  would  have  considerable  discretion.  Private  busi- 
nesspeople lived in fear of an investigation by  tax inspectors with draconian 
powers. 
Of course, the state tightly controlled the banking system. In all East Euro- 
pean  countries  there was a monobank,  so called because  all functions  of  a 
central and commercial bank were effectively fused into one institution. This 
monobank oversaw all credit in the economy, with the goal of ensuring that it 
was allocated in support of the economic plan.4 There were some supposedly 
independent  cooperative  banks,  for example, for Polish  agriculture,  but  in 
practice they were tightly controlled. 
At the beginning of Communist rule, these regimes could seize any property 
they wanted.’ As time went by  and the political  situation changed, the state 
became less inclined to use brute force against its citizens. There were excep- 
tions, of course, and we know that the use of such force was seriously consid- 
ered during 1989 by some East European governments. Communist states re- 
served the right to act with force against any perceived  opposition,  and the 
state’s perception  of  what constituted  opposition could change very rapidly. 
Actual and would-be private businesspeople were well aware of this fact. 
In the mid- 1960s, the private sector in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland 
was extremely  weak  and-with  the exception  of  private  agriculture  in Po- 
land-constituted  a marginal economic phenomenon.  In all three countries, 
we can consider the private sector as beginning from a similar starting point. 
Interestingly, as the next section shows, by the early 1990s there were signifi- 
cant differences among the private sectors in these countries. 
16.2  Survey of Available Evidence 
There is a lack of good data on the current situation of the private sector in 
Eastern Europe. Existing official statistical systems were constructed to moni- 
tor the performance of  state enterprises,  and they  have been modified only 
slowly to measure new nonstate business. Unfortunately, Eastern Europe also 
lacks well-developed private sources of information, such as consultants’ re- 
ports and local academics’ research papers. While there are Western private 
consulting, accounting, and law firms operating in all three countries with the 
express purpose of  providing detailed information on how to operate a (West- 
ern) private firm locally, we could not afford to buy the advice of these firms. 
Our approach  was  to commission  consultants’  reports  for each country. 
4. The functioning of the credit system under communism is reviewed by Johnson, Kroll, and 
Horton (I 993). 
5. In some cases, this was not a legal right but simply the result of  the state’s coercive powers. 
For example, the property of  some small firms was “nationalized” in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
illegally-i.e.,  this action was not legal even under the Communists’ laws. 249  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
These reports were prepared during the fall of 199 1 by independent researchers 
in each country, in the form of responses to a questionnaire.6 As far as possible, 
all responses were checked by researchers in the United States against sources 
available here. Some inadvertent errors probably remain, and in addition we 
need to attach an important caveat to our description of tax rules. Tax regula- 
tions in these countries are currently very complicated and in flux. 
Our survey covered Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the CSFR, Hungary, 
and Poland. However, the information provided for Bulgaria and Romania was 
less well documented  and harder to check in the United States. Furthermore, 
it was clear that the urban private sector in Bulgaria and Romania was in a 
similar situation to that of the CSFR. Compared to Bulgaria and Romania, the 
CSFR is widely considered to have advantages-such  as location and a strong 
industrial tradition-so  we concentrated on the CSFR, reasoning that it should 
have the best potential for private-sector growth among those countries that 
ended the Communist era with only weak private business. 
For each country I offer an organized set of facts. First and most important, 
I present all available information related to the number of private firms and 
the scale of their activities. Second, I review the current situation on a number 
of  previous constraints that the Communists used to restrict the private sector. 
I answer the following questions. Is there  now equal legal treatment  of  the 
private sector? Are there still shortages of inputs, and can all goods be freely 
exported  and imported? Does the private sector have any tax advantages or 
disadvantages? Is there a banking system that is willing and able to lend to the 
private sector at reasonable rates of interest? Do private businesspeople have 
assets that they can use as collateral? More generally, what government poli- 
cies are in place to help the private sector, and have they had any noticeable 
effects? I refer here not only to policies that are explicitly targeted at the private 
sector but also to more general macroeconomic policies  that may have im- 
portant indirect implications. 
Third, I present evidence on a development that is proving important for the 
future prospects of the private sector-the  privatization of  shops and small 
firms. It is not the goal of this paper to explore in detail privatization plans, but 
it is a relevant issue to the extent that it creates new entrepreneurs  or helps 
existing private businesses to expand. 
I look first at the CSFR, using it as a benchmark because its private sector 
is so weak. This makes clearer the relative advantages and remaining problems 
that I examine for Hungary and Poland. 
6. Simon Johnson drew up the questionnaire, and MCR Research contacted independent consul- 
tants in each country and supervised all the administrative arrangements. Consultants were paid 
only when they sent by fax a response to the questionnaire that satisfied MCR. Most of the infor- 
mation received was  detailed and accurate and  drew on local language  sources that were not 
readily available outside that country. The sole exception was Bulgaria, where it proved impossible 
to find a reliable person. As far as possible, we checked the information provided with sources 
available outside the country and did not find any serious errors. 250  Simon Johnson 
16.2.1  The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) 
There  were  no  legal  private  firms  in  Czechoslovakia-as  it  was  then 
called-under  the Communist regime. However, this situation changed rapidly 
after the “Velvet Revolution” of November  1989 caused the downfall of  the 
Communist regime. By the end of 1990 there were a total of 488,000 “private 
firms,” by 30 June 1991 this number had risen to 921,000 (Tydenik hospodur- 
skych novin, 12 September 1991), and by the end of  September 1991 there 
were 1.13 million (Ecosewice, 11 December 1991). This is an impressive rate 
of  growth, but very few private firms-fewer  than 5,000-were  incorporated 
as of  30 June 1991.7 The remaining  “private  firms”  are actually individuals 
who are registered as engaged in business, of whom between 25 and 85 percent 
are estimated to have at least one other job.* 
By 30 June 1991, the number of registered entrepreneurs in various sectors 
was divided into the following proportions: 27.6 percent in industrial produc- 
tion, 24.8 percent in construction,  17.2 percent in trade, 9.9 percent in nontrade 
services, and 20.5 percent  in other  sector^.^ The same broad pattern is con- 
firmed by the latest available statistics for registered entrepreneurs at the end 
of September.’O The sectoral composition  of the CSFR private  sector seems 
fairly stable. 
According to preliminary  official  statistics, small enterprises-defined  as 
those nonstate and state firms with fewer than  fifty employees-contributed 
only  1.92 percent of GNP in the Czech Republic during the first months of 
1991. This share was even lower in the Slovak Republic--0.54  percent. The 
contribution of private firms was also low: 0.07 percent in the Czech Republic 
and 0.54 percent in the Slovak Republic. Better information will be available 
only when the tax data for 1991 are available in the spring of  1992. 
The current situation of the CSFR private sector is fairly clear, There was a 
rapid growth  in the number of  private  businesses  after the political  regime 
changed, but many of  these  “firms” represent  only would-be entrepreneurs, 
7. Ekonom (a CSFR economic news  service) reported on 6 December  1991 that there were 
2,s 11 “private firms” in the Czech Republic. This number must refer to incorporated firms, and 
we assume that there are fewer incorporated firms in the Slovak Republic. This suggests that our 
estimate of 5,000 incorporated firms is an upper limit. 
8. Under law, there are two types of  private enterprise in the CSFR. First, there is a private 
person who is registered as an entrepreneur by the local municipality. For some sectors, registra- 
tion is possible only if the person can prove that he or she has special skills. Second, there is an 
incorporated company that may take one of three forms: a joint-stock company, a limited-liability 
company, or a partnership for which liability is not limited. All three forms require a minimum of 
KZs 100,000 ($3,000) in paid-up capital. 
9. Further data that confirm this picture were collected by CreditLine and published on 13 July 
1991. According to this source, on  1 March 1991 there were 655,000  private firms, of which 28.9 
percent were in industry, 25.7 percent in construction,  15 percent in trade, and 10.5 percent in 
services.  “Services”  comprised  mostly  tourist  agencies-of  which  there  were  3,500  in  the 
CSFR-and  consultancy. 
10. The percentage of entrepreneurs registered in different sectors was as follows: industry, 26 
percent; construction, 23 percent; trade, 20 percent; travel, 10 percent; and industrial services, 12 
percent (Rutland 1992). 251  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
and the sum total of private activity is still rather insignificant. There appears 
to be an entrepreneurial  spirit, but can it develop a more substantial private 
sector? 
The answer to this question must depend on current conditions, which could 
either promote  or hold back private-sector development. We need to look at 
government policy-especially  macroeconomic, trade, and public finance pol- 
icy-as  well as the availability  of credit and the effects of the privatization 
process on the private sector. 
Very  quickly  after the November  1989 “revolution,”  the new government 
announced  that private and state enterprises  should now receive equal legal 
treatment. A constitutional amendment has been adopted, in the form of  law 
number  100/91 Sb., which states that all owners are equal before the law. The 
government has repeatedly stated that it regards the development of small- and 
medium-sized  private enterprises  as essential  for the success  of  the market 
economy.ll There now really  appears to be no difference in the rights of the 
private sector in the CSFR and in Western industrialized countries.12 
Furthermore, the government has established a tight macroeconomic policy 
that has made possible a substantial degree of convertibility, allowed the liber- 
alization of  trade,  and eliminated shortages.13 According  to a survey of  top 
industrial managers conducted by the Federal Statistical Agency in April 1991, 
the supply of  domestic raw materials and semifinished goods was considered 
satisfactory by 71 percent of respondents  and unsatisfactory  by only  14 per- 
cent.I4 As a further indicator of macroeconomic policy changes,  unemploy- 
ment-which  was essentially zero in the Communist period-was  6.6  percent 
for the whole CSFR at the end of  1991. Unemployment  was  11.8 percent in 
the Slovak Republic and 4.1 percent in the Czech Republic. 
Most goods can be imported, subject only to certain duties that do not differ 
according to whether a firm is state or privately owned and that are not very 
high.I5  There  remain,  however,  several  restrictions  on  payments  made 
abroad-the  most important being that, while incorporated private firms can 
11. See, e.g.,  the speech by Minister Dlouhy to the Federal Assembly, reported in Hospodurske 
nuviny, 25 September 1991. 
12. This statement should not be taken to mean that the whole system of private property already 
functions as in the West. Still to be resolved are important issues of privatization and the restitution 
of property seized by the Communists. The effects of these issues are dealt with below. 
13. It is important to keep in mind that these shortages were never as severe in the CSFR as 
they were in Poland during the 1980s. 
14. Only 47 percent of respondents were satisfied with the supply of goods from abroad, but, 
given the lack of import restrictions, this may just reflect expectations that were disappointed when 
the economy was opened up. Imported goods are expensive for CSFR firms and consumers. 
15. An importer is liable to two taxes: first, a cnstoms duty that is a percentage of the landed 
cost and that depends on the type of good (there are 5,190 different categories); second, a flat 
import duty (15 percent of  the landed cost) that applies to all finished consumer goods. This duty 
is not charged on raw materials, machinery, and other productive inputs, and there is an exemption 
for a limited time for some goods-such  as computers. In fall 1991 there were announced inten- 
tions to raise the customs duty on agricultural products, some electronics, and some textiles while 
the rates would be lowered on raw materials and spare parts. 252  Simon Johnson 
purchase foreign currency with which to buy imports, individual entrepreneurs 
cannot.16 Not surprisingly, there is anecdotal evidence that private individuals 
smuggle goods into the CSFR. As far as we can ascertain, there remain no 
significant export restrictions.  In January  1991, there was still a small black 
market premium, not in excess of  10 percent-it  is hard to know the precise 
rate because quotes on the street are often designed to attract foreign customers 
who can be cheated. 
Nevertheless,  the  overall  conclusion  must  be  that  the  new  government 
moved rapidly to establish general legal principles  favorable to private busi- 
ness, to free prices, and to create supportive government agencies.” However, 
the government has also been criticized by entrepreneurs’ organizations for not 
having done more, particularly on taxes and credit. 
The current tax  situation in the CSFR is difficult to specify precisely be- 
cause the introduction of a new commercial code on 1 January  1992 was in- 
tended  to change regulations  significantly but was not preceded  by  detailed 
announcements. On many issues, the previous tax treatment of private business 
was murky, and the code-based  on the German and Austrian  models-is 
supposed to provide clarification. The tax regulations that follow represent our 
understanding of private-sector taxation at the end of  199  1. 
Self-employed individuals are exempt from the wage tax, which is a hefty 
50 percent. Although there are no hard data, we suspect that a great number of 
the more than 1 million registered entrepreneurs are actually working for other 
people and are registered as self-employed only to reduce the cost of hiring 
them. One supportive anecdote is a private construction firm  in Prague that, at 
the beginning of  1992, had 500 workers-all  of whom were officially  self- 
employed. 
All firms, irrespective of ownership, face the same rates of turnover tax and 
social security tax, and all are quite restricted-compared  to standard practice 
in the West-in  the range of business expenses that they are allowed to claim 
as tax-deductible  costs.18  Incorporated  private firms are subject to the same 
progressive corporate tax rates as state enterprises,  although there are some 
advantages for joint ventures.I9 A significant number of the smaller joint ven- 
16. An  importing CSFR firm must present a valid invoice in order for a payment to be made 
abroad. However, the CSFR bank will not make the payment for three months if  the amount in- 
volved is above a certain size-at  the beginning of  1991, this was KEs  1 million ($30,000),  but, 
by mid-1991. it had been raised to KEs 3 million ($90,000). 
17. For example, there is now a Federal Agency for Mediating Foreign Economic Assistance, 
headed by a former World Bank staff member, and an Agency for Foreign Investment and Assis- 
tance at the Ministry of Industry. Active in providing training for CSFR managers are the British 
Know How Fund, USAID, USIA, and the Swiss Rotary Club. 
18. The four basic levels of turnover tax are 0, 11, 20, and 29 percent. The social security tax 
depends on the level of salary, marital status, and number of children. For example, the social 
security tax on a monthly salary of KEs 6,000 ($200) is 8.7 percent. 
19. The rate is 20 percent for up to KEs 200,000 ($6,000)  of taxable corporate income, rising to 
55 percent for more than  KEs  200,000 for a domestic company but only to 40 percent for joint 
ventures with capital investment above 30 percent of their paid-up capital. Joint ventures can also 253  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.1  Personal Income Tax Rates in the CSFR 
Annual Income (Kfs)  Tax Rate 
0-60.000  I596 
60,000-1 80,000 
180,000-540,OOO 
540.000-I  ,080,000 
1,080,000  and above 
KEs 9,000 plus 25% of taxable income over KEs 60,000 
KEs 39,000 plus 35% of  taxable income over KEs 180,000 
KEs 165,000 plus 45% of taxable income over KEs 540,000 
KEs 408,000 plus 55% of  taxable income over KEs  1,080,000 
Source: Consultant’s report. 
Note: Personal income tax is regulated by law no. 389/90 Sb. There are approximately KEs  30.00 
to $I .oo. 
tures are apparently disguised private CSFR businesses.20 However, a bigger 
advantage exists for registered private entrepreneurs, who pay personal income 
tax on their earnings (see table 16.1) and who can claim accelerated deprecia- 
tion for machinery and some other equipment if it is produced in the CSFR. 
They cannot, however, carry current losses into a subsequent financial year to 
offset future tax liability. This package constitutes only slight tax advantages 
for the unincorporated private sector compared with incorporated private firms 
and with state firms. 
As part of the anti-inflation policy, there are limits on wages that are set by 
the Federal Ministry of Finance. The permitted rate of  nominal wage growth 
was 9 percent in the first quarter of 1991 and 22 percent in the second quarter.*’ 
However, in the first half of the year, average wage growth was less than these 
ceilings allow-there  was a real wage fall of about 20 percent. These wage 
regulations do not currently apply to firms with fewer than twenty-five employ- 
ees.**  Again, this represents a slight advantage for the small private sector. 
Up to the end of  1991, there were no special incentives or credit policies to 
apply for a two-year income tax holidary if earnings are retained in the CSFR and reinvested in 
privatization or in the development of a retail distribution network. Joint ventures can also apply 
for accelerated depreciation of  capital equipment that is used for domestic production. Commer- 
cial banks and other financial institutions should pay 65 percent of their corporate income as taxes. 
20. At the end of 1990, there were 1,236 joint ventures, and, by 23 July 1991 there were 2,937. 
In July, 84 percent of  these firms had paid-up capital under KEs  1 million ($30,000). and 1,187 
had only the minimum required amount-KEs  100,OOO.  There were 22 large joint ventures with 
capital above Ki-s 10 million ($300,000), representing 84 percent of  total paid-up capital and 80 
percent of all foreign capital in joint ventures. Most joint ventures were with CSFR legal or private 
persons-only  374 were with state-owned firms. This latter type of joint venture represented nine- 
teen of  the twenty-two large joint ventures and only 6 percent of joint ventures with capital less 
than KEs  1 million ($30,000). 
2 1. If the permitted wage growth rate is exceeded by  more than 3 percentage points, there is a 
200 percent tax on the extra payments to workers, and this tax rises to 750 percent if wages rise 
more than 5 percentage points over the limit. 
22. On  25  September  1991, while presenting the government’s  program for  1992, Minister 
Dlouhy said that wages in the private sector should be the result of unregulated contracts between 
employer and employee. 254  Simon Johnson 
promote  small- and medium-sized  firmsz3  Credit was available  to fund the 
purchase of assets in the “small privatization” process, but at an interest rate 
that was not significantly below the usual rates. Recognizing the difficulties of 
the private  sector, on  16 January  1992 the Czech Republic  allocated  KEs  1 
billion ($30 million) to help small businesses. This program will provide up to 
a 40 percent  subsidy on interest rates  and guarantees for 70 percent  of  the 
principal. Of course, it is too early to judge the effect of this initiative, but it is 
unlikely to stimulate the private sector quickly. Why is it so difficult to promote 
the private sector? 
Part of the answer lies in the credit system. The CSFR’s financial system is 
still dominated by  state-owned banks. At the start of  1990, the monobank was 
dissolved and replaced  in commercial  banking by  seven new banks-some- 
times called commercial banks-although  at the end of  1991 the largest of 
these banks still made almost 50 percent of all loans and the top three banks 
accounted for more than 80 percent of all credit. The banking system in the 
CSFR remains much more concentrated than in either Hungary or Poland, and, 
although most banks are due to be privatized in the spring of 1992, apparently 
there will not be further demonop~lization.~~ 
There has been some entry into this sector, but the newer banks still do not 
account for a large part of  credit. By the end of  1990, there were twenty-five 
commercial banks, and, in August 1991,  there were thirty-four banks. With the 
exception  of  seven subsidiaries  of  foreign banks,  all  thirty-four banks  were 
either state-owned or joint-stock companies having a substantial state 
There are also at least two smaller banks with the stated aim of financing small- 
and medium-sized firms.zh 
According to the new banking laws passed at the end of 1989, state commer- 
cial banks cannot raise capital from outside sources, even though their capital- 
asset ratio is rather low. The level of losses on bad loans may exceed these 
banks’ own capital, and the banks are reportedly becoming more cautiou~.~’ 
23. However, the Ministry  for Economic Development in the Czech Republic has reportedly 
prepared a law that is intended to promote small- and medium-sized enterprises through changes 
in taxes and insurance conditions. Funds may also be established that will help provide  private 
firms with collateral (Tydenik hospodarskych novin, no. 30 [ 19911). 
24. The current idea is to place 40 percent of bank shares through the coupon method and sell 
10-15  percent to private foreign investors, with the state retaining the remaining shares. 
25. Two examples of foreign bank investment are the subsidiary of Creditanstalt, with paid-up 
capital of $20 million and the creation of a joint venturc between Societe General and Komercni 
banka  Praha.  Up to the end of  1991, however, most  foreign banks seem primarily involved  in 
consulting work. 
26. These banks are Slovenska zarucni banka and Banka Bohemia-a  joint-stock company with 
KEs  70 million ($2 million) in paid-up capital and 52 percent of its shares owned by seven trade 
unions.  Both  banks say that  they  differ from other banks because they  do not  ask  for private 
property as collateral. The Czech Union of Private Entrepreneurs is negotiating with the German 
Union of Private Entrepreneurs to borrow DM 100 million ($70 million) at 6 percent for two years. 
These funds would be used to create a special bank to promote small- and medium-sized firms. 
27. One estimate is that, of  KZs 700 billion ($23 billion) total bank credit, between KZs  100 and 
KEs 200 billion cannot be repaid (Banker, no. 46 [December 19911). 255  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.2  Prices in the CSFR during 1991 (index with December 1990 = 100) 
Month 
Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May  Jun.  Jul 
Food  133.1  131.8  129.1  128.0  127.9  127.3  127.2 
Consumer goods  125.0  140.0  156.0  160.0  168.0  169.0  167.4 
Services  110.0  113.0  114.0  121.0  126.0  141.0  140.9 
Total CPI  128.0  132.0  141.0  143.0  147.0  151.0  149.2 
Source:  Tvdenik hospodurskych novin, no. 36 (199  I), from official statistics of  Federalni statis- 
ticky urad. 
This is reflected in  the rising relative proportion of  short-term loans, which 
were 28.1 percent of all credit at the end of 1990 but had already reached 36.2 
percent by  30 June 1991 (Tydenik hospodurskych novin, nos.  19, 40 [1991]). 
On 30 June 1991, total credits issued stood at KEs 662.9 billion ($22 billion), 
of  which only KEs  24.7 billion ($820 million)  were lent to individuals and 
private business combined, and of which only KEs  1.5 billion ($50 million) 
was reported as lent to private business (Brandsma 1991).2x 
Nominal  interest  rates-which  are set by  the  central  bank-fell  during 
1991, but real interest rates rose dramatically. Nominal loan rates were high at 
the beginning of  1991-up  to 24 percent per year-but  they fell steadily. For 
example, in September 1991, the discount rate was reduced from  10 to 9.5 
percent, and the maximum interest rate that commercial banks could charge 
on credits was lowered even more sharply, from 19.5 to 17 percent. As table 
16.2 shows, there were sharp price increases at the beginning of the year, and 
the high inflation in the first seven months of  1991 implied negative real inter- 
est rates. However, in the second half of  1991, prices were roughly constant- 
retail prices recorded  an  increase  of  only  45.3 percent for the  whole year 
(Hospodurske noviny, 21 January 1992). Real interest rates must now be con- 
sidered rather high and unlikely to encourage private borrowing. 
Of course, the lack of  loans to the private sector could also be due to the 
requirements of bank lending. In principle, borrowing from a bank is not too 
difficult. In order to obtain a loan, an entrepreneur has to produce evidence 
that he or she is either incorporated or registered by  a local municipality. The 
entrepreneur must also specify his or  her objectives and provide a business 
plan and all relevant financial data.29  In most cases, private property is needed 
as collateral, and most banks prefer to secure their loans with real estate. 
28. Because of  the perceived problems with commercial banks, a second round of  banking 
reform was supposed to begin in January 1992 and involve at least partial privatization of banks. 
However, this round of  privatization has now been delayed. It  is also unclear how privatization 
alone will strengthen banks’ balance sheets. 
29. Compared to Western industrialized countries, we would expect that a lower proportion of 
people in the CSFR  know how to prepare a business plan. However, there are now educational 
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Table 16.3  The Housing Stock in the CSFR (31 December 1989) 
CSFR  Czech Rep.  Slovak Rep 
No. of apartments  5,860,286  4,082,357  1,777,929 
Of which (% shares): 
State  24.  I  27.0  17.4 
Cooperative  18.3  17.5  20.1 
State enterprise  8.9  9.7  6.8 
In private houses  48.7  45.8  55.7 
Source: Hospodarske noviny, no. 52 (1990); Tvdenik hospodarskych novin, no. 9 (1991); Federalni 
statisticky urad. 
There is some private property that in principle could be mortgaged. Almost 
half the housing stock in the CSFR is privately owned-table  16.3 shows the 
distribution by  type of ownership and republic-and  most of this housing is 
presently unmortgaged. Does this mean that there is a fund of property that is 
available for use as collateral? 
The answer is rather complicated because there is a strict tenancy law that 
makes eviction very difficult, even in the case of foreclosure. For this reason, 
banks  do not  usually  accept private apartments as ~ollateral.~"  Cooperative 
apartments are also quite unsuitable as collateral."  However, mortgage credit 
can be obtained against the security of some private houses, particularly sec- 
ond homes in  rural  areas.32 Unfortunately,  it is not  possible  to determine 
whether this potential collateral is in the hands of would-be entrepreneurs. 
All this evidence suggests two conclusions.  First, there are no remaining 
barriers to private-sector growth that could be rapidly removed by government 
action. Second, it is unlikely that the CSFR private sector will soon amount 
to a large part of  the economy.  There are plenty  of  people who want to be 
entrepreneurs, but it is difficult for them to expand rapidly, and there are no 
easy answers to their problems with the credit system. 
This rather pessimistic conclusion does suggest a further question. Can the 
process of small privatization-especially  the sale of shops-help  the accu- 
30. There are not many such apartments, even though, according to Czech law no. 283190 Sb., 
municipalities are allowed to sell state-owned apartments to private persons. The process of hous- 
ing privatization has been slowed down by restitution claims. 
31. According to law no. 176/90 Sb., a member of a housing cooperative can transfer his or her 
rights and obligations to another person, provided that the housing cooperative agrees. The second 
person must then become a member of the cooperative. A cooperative apartment remains always 
the property of the cooperative, and a person can buy and sell only the right to use it. 
32. Agricultural land remains predominantly nonprivate. According to official statistics, in 1988 
there were 6,749,000 hectares of land in state and cooperative farms, and only 261,000 hectares 
were farmed by  "self-producers," it.,  private farmers. There are not yet any official statistics con- 
cerning the privatization of land, even though some land has been obtained by former members of 
cooperatives. Still outstanding are most claims for the restitution of land seized after the Second 
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mulation of capital in the private sector? Can the government promote private 
business by helping it acquire privatized 
The privatization of retail shops and restaurants is governed by the so-called 
small privatization law, number 427190 Sb. There are no official data on the 
number of shops affected, and estimates range between 70,000 and 130,000 
for the whole CSFR  (Banker, no. 46 [December 19911). Almost  all priva- 
tizations take the form of an auction, sometimes for full ownership rights, more 
often for a two-year lea~e.’~  Recently, there have also been auctions of  five- 
year leases. Around 12 percent of all sales have been through “Dutch auctions,” 
which are intended to facilitate sales in areas where demand for retail space is 
not great.35  By the end of  1991, 19,500 units had been sold or leased in the 
CSFR, for a combined price of KCs 25.5 billion ($800 million) (Rutland 1992). 
For most types of retail shop, the new operator or owner can freely choose the 
goods to be sold.36 
Until the small privatization process began at the start of  1991, there were 
almost no private retail shops or restaurants. Small privatization continues but 
will not quickly transform the structure of the economy. Quite probably, the 
most attractive properties were auctioned first, and the pace of small privatiza- 
tion will slow. 
Restitution has been resolved in principle by legislation, but important prac- 
tical issues remain.37  The only property that can be claimed is that which was 
nationalized or confiscated after 25 February 1948.38  Restitution will either be 
through returning the original property or through a combination of cash and 
government bonds as compensation. By September 1991, 12,000 claims under 
law number 87/91 had been presented to the CSFR Ministry of Finance. Under 
these laws, there are deadlines by which claims must be made. However, the 
last deadline at this time-for  claims on land-is  31 December 1992, so the 
restitution process is far from complete. 
Even  if  these  complications with  small  privatization  are resolved,  most 
CSFR production and employment remains concentrated in large firms, which 
33. It  is up to the Federal Ministry of  Finance and the Republic Ministries of  Privatization 
whether a particular firm should be treated as large or small and dealt with under law no. 91/91 
Sb. or law no. 427/90 Sb., respectively. 
34. The first time a set of  property rights is auctioned, only Czech and Slovak citizens are 
allowed to bid. Foreigners can bid at subsequent auctions if the property rights are not bought in 
the first round. 
35. See the statement by  Minister Jezek in  Hospodarske noviny,  1  October  1991. The term 
Dutch auction is used in the CSFR to describe an auction in which the asking price starts at book 
value and then falls until a purchase is made or until the minimum reserve price is reached. Dutch 
auctions have been used in less wealthy regions; in the center of Prague, there are no Dutch auc- 
tions, and the selling price has been on average thirteen times higher than the initial asking price. 
36. An important exception is food shops-for  one year after an auction or restitution there 
cannot be a substantial change in the type of goods sold. 
37. Claims can be made under laws nos. 403/90,458/90, 87/91, 229/91, and 137/91 Sb. 
38. This effectively excludes firms that were confiscated after the Second World War because 
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the private sector is not in a position to purchase quickly. At the same time, 
the so-called large privatization  has been delayed and has not generated rapid 
success. The CSFR faces a serious problem because of the size disparity be- 
tween the very young private sector and the existing state sector. It is unlikely 
that the private sector can provide a significant share of output, particularly in 
industry, for some years. Unless  large state firms are broken  up  into small, 
more digestible pieces, it is also unlikely that the existing private firms will be 
able to purchase a significant amount of privatized assets. 
16.2.2  Hungary 
Given the fact that the private sector has been developing in Hungary for a 
rclatively long period-at  least since 1982 and arguably since 1968-it  might 
be expected that  Hungarian  official  statistics would  better cover the private 
sector than is usual in Eastern Europe. If anything, the opposite is true. Most 
disappointing is that there exist almost no official data that show directly the 
property form of an enterprise.j9 As a result, it is extremely hard to determine 
what is really private and what represents some reorganized form of state en- 
terprise in Hungary.40 
The available statistics on the number of firms are given in table  16.4. The 
Hungarian Statistical Office divides firms into a number of categories, which 
are represented  in this table. First, there are five forms of  state companies: 
enterprises, trusts, subsidiaries, joint companies (known in Hungarian as Ko- 
zosvallalat), and  associations  (known  in  Hungarian  as Egyesules). Second, 
there are incorporated  firms, which  include both joint-stock companies and 
limited-liability c~mpanies.~’  Third, there are various kinds of cooperatives. 
There are also joint ventures with foreign partners and unincorporated  busi- 
nesses, neither of which are included in table 16.4.42 
The most striking fact revealed in table 16.4 is the rapid rise in the number 
of limited-liability companies during 1990. This rise is confirmed by numbers 
that are available for the end of 1990, which show 18,317 limited-liability com- 
panies and 646  joint-stock companies (Figyelo,  no. 39 [  19911).41  As table 16.4 
shows, by the end of June 1991, there were 28,059 limited-liability companies 
39. The statistical office uses the term privute to refer to individual entrepreneurs. The actual 
level of private capital in a company is nowhere measured. 
40. This confusion is partly due to the fact that in Hungary, particularly  between  1989 and 1990, 
state enterprises were able to initiate “spontaneous” privatization  (Stark 1990). State enterprises 
never had this opportunity in the CSFR. 
41. As far as we know, nearly all joint-stock companies so far have been established by  state 
enterprises, but most limited-liability companies were founded by private individuals. 
42. Sometimes three types of  firms-joint-stock  companies, limited-liability  companies, and 
joint ventures-are  classified  together as economic companies (known as gazdasagi tarasago in 
Hungarian). 
43. Figyelu (Observer) is a Hungarian economic weekly. Table 16.4  Number of Hungarian Firms, by Institutional Form (excluding unincorporated firms) 


















1,782  1,910  1,940  1.955  1,986  2,001  2,008 
25  254  345  397  39 1  398  373 
21  1  25 1  276  302  309  327  25 1 
45  57  61  69  78  105  198 
187 
201 
19  62  74  I37  116  307  594  646  784 
...  ...  ...  ...  45 I  4,485  15,560  18,317  28,059 
1,387  1,350  1,340  1,337  1,333  1,333  1,392 
2,745  2,735  2,719  2,658  2,439  2,510  2,559 
145  762  1,278  2, I54  3,108  3,233  3,191 
...  535  545  588  600  470  576 
...  7,916  8,578  9,597  10,811  15,169  26,702 
All data are for the end of  the respective month. 
Sources: Economic Trends in Hungary (Budapest: Gazdasagkutato Intezet, November 1990). except for May 1991 data, which are from Heti Vilaggaz- 
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in Hungary. By the end of  1991, there were between 52,000 and 53,000 incor- 
porated businesses in Hungary.- 
The growth in limited-liability companies provides  a rough  indicator for 
the development of private business, although some of these “new” firms may 
actually be previously existing firms which were legally registered for the first 
time.45 We  also know  that,  during  1990,  14,867 “economic  organizations” 
were  “founded”-although  only  13,49  1  were  classified  as being  “new”- 
while 632 were closed and 202 reported as having no legal successor (Central 
Statistical Office, Monthly  Statistics, July  199  1). Unfortunately,  this  source 
does not indicate either the property  form or the  sectors of  those firms that 
opened and closed. 
There has also been a rapid growth in the number of joint ventures in Hun- 
gary-in  the first nine months of  1990, 2,225 new joint ventures were estab- 
li~hed.~~  There are obvious tax advantages to forming a joint venture, although 
the  minimum  required  investment  is  quite  high-Ft  50  million  (about 
$650,000).47  However, there are no statistics that reveal the extent of participa- 
tion by the Hungarian private sector in these joint ventures. 
The number of  unincorporated  firms has also risen. There are two kinds 
of  partnerships in Hungary: ordinary partnerships, in which all partners have 
unlimited liability, and limited partnerships, in which “full” partners have un- 
limited liability but any “silent” partner has limited liability. On 31 December 
1989, there were 5,769 ordinary partnerships and 1,125 limited partnerships, 
but, by  31 May  1991, these totals had risen to 10,869 and 9,537, respectively 
(Heti Vilaggazdasag, 19 October 1991). 
It is surprisingly difficult to obtain statistics on the number of  individual 
entrepreneurs in Hungary. One estimate is that there are over 300,000 such 
people.48  Another informed source states there are 500,000.4’  We have not been 
able to obtain satisfactory confirmation  of  this number, and we recommend 
treating it with extreme caution. 
These statistics suggest that there is a boom in the creation of new business 
in Hungary, and it is likely that much of this business can be considered to be 
44. These numbers were provided by Kalman Mizsei in his comments on this paper at the con- 
ference. 
45. It is well known that there has long been a vibrant underground economy in Hungary(see, 
e.g., Stark 1989). 
46. A joint venture can obtain a 60 percent reduction in its taxable income during its first five 
years, and a 40 percent reduction subsequently, provided that it satisfies the following conditions: 
that most of its revenue  is from selling goods or running a hotel  that it built; that its registered 
capital exceeds Ft 50 million  ($650,000); and that at least 30 percent of its capital  is foreign. A 
joint venture can receive even more generous allowances if it operates in certain “important activi- 
ties,” which have been established by law. 
47. The official exchange rate is Ft 76.00 to $1.00. In mid-1991, the black market rate was Ft 
80.00 to $1 .oo. 
48. This figure  was given  by  Csilla Huvyadi  in  a presentation  at the  AEA  meeting in  New 
Orleans, January  1992. We have been unable to find a published referencc. 
49. This number was provided by Kalman Mizsei. 261  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
private. It makes sense that Hungary’s private economy should be more devel- 
oped than the CSFR’s,  not least because Hungary’s comprehensive reform leg- 
islation was initiated earlier.5o  The most important legislation was the Com- 
pany Law of 1988, supported by the Law on Transformation of  1989, which 
made  it possible  to establish  new  forms of  enterprise-such  as joint-stock 
companies and limited-liability companies. However, the sustained growth of 
the Hungarian private sector can be traced back at least to the reform legisla- 
tion of 1982 (Seleny 1991). 
The Hungarian government’s policy is clear: the private sector is viewed as 
an essential part of the economy and at this time should receive some advan- 
tages. Whether these advantages are sufficient remains contr~versial.~’  There 
certainly appears to be no special, comprehensive program to help the private 
sector. 
The prerequisites for private-sector growth are arguably in place. The mac- 
roeconomic situation has sufficiently improved, and, although there is still sig- 
nificant inflation, there are no longer any significant  shortage^.^^ Foreign trade 
is less controlled than in the past, and imports can be made by any kind of firm 
or by private individuals. However, trade is not completely free. There are tar- 
iffs, and about one-third of all agricultural products still require an export li- 
cence. About 10 percent of  imports are still not liberalized, including raw ma- 
terials, semifinished goods, agricultural products, and some consumer goods. 
There are also some quotas, for example, on cars. 
There is no difference in the tax rates faced by private and state firms, for 
example, on turnover taxes.53  There is a 40 percent tax on profits, and the social 
security contribution is 43 percent of an employee’s gross wage.54 However, 
there are some tax advantages for private firms in the form of allowances that 
reduce profit-tax liability. Every firm that is owned by private individuals re- 
ceives a 50 percent  reduction  in its profit tax, but only during  1991-93.  In 
addition, any firm that has at least 50 percent private ownership can obtain 
accelerated depreciation  allowance^.^^ There is a 40 percent tax on profits, but 
private individuals instead pay personal income tax. As is apparent from table 
50. The most notable pieces of  recent legislation were the Company Law (no. VI,  1988). the 
Transformation Law  (no. XIII,  1989). the Law  on  State Property Agency (no. VII,  1990), the 
Act on Securities (1990), the Preprivatization Act (no. LXXIV, 1990), the Act on Direct Foreign 
Investment in Hungary (1990), and the Asset Policy Guidelines (decree no. 20, 1990, of the Hun- 
garian Parliament). 
5 I. For example, Kornai (1990) makes a strong case for more substantial assistance to the 
private sector, as a way to offset the continuing strength of the state sector. 
52. Hungary still imports most of its oil from the former Soviet Union, and these deliveries have 
been less than the agreed-on levels. Therefore, there is a potential shortage of  energy that can be 
linked to the disintegration of  the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and the 
problems inside the former Soviet Union. 
53. The tumover-tax rates for services are 0, 15, and 25 percent, and for products they are 0 and 
25 percent. 
54. There is an additional tax that is intended to finance unemployment benefits. Employers pay 
1.5 percent of  gross wages, and each employee pays 0.5 percent of his or her gross wage. 
55. There are also tax breaks for “important” investments in infrastructure and agriculture. 262  Simon Johnson 
Table 16.5  Income Tax Rates in Hungary 
Annual Income (Ft)  Tax Rate 
0-55,000 
55,OO I-90,000 
90,OO 1-1  20,000 
120,001-150,000 
150.00 1-300.000 
300,oo  1-500,000 
500,001 and above 
0% 
12% of taxable income over Ft 55,000 
Ft 4,200 plus 18% of taxable income over Ft  90,000 
Ft 9,600 plus 30% of taxable income over Ft  I20,OOO 
Ft  18,600 plus 32% of  taxable incomc over Ft  150.000 
Ft 66,600 plus 40% of taxable income over Ft 300,000 
Ft  146.600 plus 50% of taxable income over Ft  500,000 
Source: Consultant’s report. 
16.5, paying personal income taxes is an advantage-as  long as one’s income 
is not too far above Ft  300,000 (about $4,000). Perhaps most important, the 
private  sector is exempt from the controls on wage growth that are strictly 
enforced on the state sector. This difference in tax treatment enables private 
firms to pay higher wages and attract skilled labor. 
The state monobank was dissolved at the beginning of  1987, and five new 
state-owned “commercial banks” were created.5h  However, within the banking 
system it is evident that there are still very close ties, in the form of outstanding 
loans and cross-ownership, between very large state firms and banks.57  There 
are fears that the Hungarian industrial structure will begin to resemble that of 
Yugoslavia, where banks help firms find ways to keep their budget constraints 
“soft.” However, a counterclaim can also be made-that  Hungary is following 
the successful German model of allowing close links between banks and firms. 
In order to obtain a loan, a Hungarian entrepreneur must demonstrate that 
he or she has a satisfactory business plan and also provide some collateral. The 
one serious problem appears to be that it is very difficult to obtain mortgage 
credit-to  borrow against the security of an apartment or a  There is 
also relatively little private land in Hungary.5y 
Nominal interest rates also remain quite high. In the first quarter of  1991, 
56. There are no special regulations on the kind of customers that these banks should serve, but 
one bank has tended to specialize in lending to small enterprises. 
57. This is true, even though in  total the state explicitly owns only 33 percent of  financial 
institutions (National Bank of  Hungary, Annuul Report, 1990).  Some observers are worried by the 
rapid growth in interenterprise credits in the state sector. In early 1991, this had reached Ft 200- 
300 billion ($3-$5  billion), which is about 10 percent of  GDP and constitutes more than half of 
all the loans received by enterprises. 
58. The reason for the lack of  mortgage credit is unclear and requires further investigation, 
particularly as it is possible to buy  and  sell private apartments freely. About 80 percent of  all 
housing is already privately owned. In all likelihood, there are complications caused  by  legal 
restrictions on eviction-as  in the CSFR and Poland. 
59. The state owns 30.8 percent of the land area, and cooperatives own 57.2 percent. So-called 
small producers operate on only 12.0 percent of  the land (annual statistics, 1989). There does not 
yet appear to be a well-developed market for agricultural land, so it is not yet attractive as col- 
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the interest rates on loans with a maturity of one year were between 23 and 50 
percent.h0  However, inflation remains quite high-prices  rose 35.7 percent in 
the first half of 1991.6’  Nevertheless, according to official statistics, at the start 
of 1990, there was Ft 374 billion ($4.7 billion) in outstanding loans to individu- 
als and to small enterprises-with  total credit of Ft  1,704 billion ($21.3 bil- 
lion) (National Bank of Hungary, Market Letter, no. 3 [1991]). There are, in 
principle,  also special credits available to help individuals and private firms 
acquire assets in the privatization  process,  but up to the end of  1991 these 
credits do not appear to have been very significant. 
The privatization process in Hungary has several elements that need to be 
mentioned here.62  Under the so-called preprivatization  law, the State Property 
Agency-to  which I will refer by its Hungarian acronym, AVU-plans  to pri- 
vatize around 10,000 shops “by  1992.” This form of privatization means pre- 
cisely that individuals can purchase the equipment and  stocks of  shops but 
obtain only the right to lease the real estate (Figyelo, 14 March 1991,4). These 
rights are to be sold in open auctions, and, if successful, this would affect about 
20 percent of all state-owned shops. 
There are some complications. AVU has been criticized for asking too high 
a price for the shops. Perhaps more important, however, is that, in most cases, 
a successful bidder pays some money to AVU for the right to lease the property 
but the actual lease payments must be made to the local government. These 
lease payments are fixed in advance, but often for a period less than the length 
of the lease. Financially pressed local governments have expressed their inter- 
est in sharply raising rents on privatized shops. 
In summer  1991, there began  a new program, called self-privatization, in 
60.  The average annual interest rates in each month were as follows: January, 33.1 percent: 
February, 34.2 percent; March, 34.8 percent; April, 35.2 percent. 
61. Monthly inflation was as follows: January, 7.5 percent; February, 4.9 percent; March, 3.7 
percent;  April,  2.4  percent;  May,  2.2 percent;  June,  2.1 percent  (National  Bank of  Hungary, 
Monrhly Review, no. 4  [1991]). Inflation in the consumer price index was 17.0 percent in 1989 and 
28.9 percent in 1990. 
62. Hungary is the only East European country in  which privatization is taking place under 
legislation that was passed when the Communists were still in control-the  Law on Protection of 
State Property (January 1990). Privatizations are supervised by the State Property Agency, which 
became operational on  1 March 1990 (Whitlock 1990). 
At first, privatization in Hungary was enterprise initiated, but, after the change of political re- 
gime, there was an attempt to use more active programs, in which the government sold assets. 
However, by mid-1991, there was dissatisfaction with the pace of privatization (see, e.g., Figyelo, 
II July  1991,  1). One  estimate  places  the  value  of  total  assets  at  around  Ft  2,000  billion 
($32 billion) (Whitlock 1990). To the middle of  1991, under AVU  (the State Property Agency) 
there have been only 160 ‘‘transformations.’’ (Before privatization, a state enterprise must be trans- 
formed into either a joint-stock company or a limited-liability company.) These  160 enterprises 
are worth Ft 203 billion ($2.34 billion), but only fifty have been fully transformed (Figyelo, 11 
July 1991, 13). 
As a result, there are new initiatives, in the form of “preprivatization” and “self-privatization,” 
which are described in the text, as well as plans to pass a new privatization law. The precise shape 
of this law is not yet clear, but it seems likely to differ from Poland’s, in that there will probably not 
be either discounts for workers in privatized enterprises or free giveaway of rights to obtain shares. 264  Simon Johnson 
which the AVU has selected eighty-four consulting companies to act as a type 
of owner for up to 600 small- and medium-sized companies-with  asset val- 
ues less than Ft 300 million ($3.8 million) and fewer than 300  By 
December  199  1, there were more than 300 contracts signed or under negotia- 
tion between AVU and consulting companies, and 132 contracts had actually 
been signed (Figyelo, 19 December I99  1, 18). It is also now possible for AVU 
to agree to a foreign bid on an enterprise without consulting the target com- 
pany.h4  Whether allowing this form of hostile takeover speeds up privatization 
remains to be seen. 
The  Hungarian  restitution  process  remains  unresolved.  Legislation  was 
passed  in April  1991, but it was deemed unconstitutional by  the Hungarian 
Supreme Court because it excluded emigrts and people whose property was 
taken before June  1949 from restitution. The political debate over this issue 
continues. 
According to current Hungarian  legislation, there will not be restitution of 
property, but people can claim compensation for property  seized after 8 June 
1949.'jS  This compensation will be paid in the form of a government bond with 
a three-year maturity  (par. 5 of  the  1991 Law on Compensation). This bond 
can be turned into a lifetime annuity or used to buy privatized property, such 
as farmland, apartments, and AVU  privatized  property. Trading these bonds 
on a secondary market is also permitted, but anyone other than the original 
bondholder can use the bond only to buy property privatized by AVU. Needless 
to say, the precise outcome of this process is still unclearh6 
Although statistical problems make it hard to know the precise situation of 
the Hungarian private sector, there are indications that its growth has acceler- 
ated in the past two years. The incorporated private business sector has grown 
particularly  fast. Unfortunately, there are no good numbers on private-sector 
employment,  and  estimates  depend greatly  on the  number  of  workers  em- 
ployed by registered  entrepreneurs. Our best guess is that the private sector 
employs between  650,000 and  1 million people, which implies that its share 
of urban employment is in the range of  15-25  percent. The future growth of 
63. Some of  these consulting companies are foreign, but  all must  be  registered  in  Hungary. 
These companies must pay a fee to the government and leave the existing management in place, 
and they cannot simply liquidate the firm. Their goal is to sell the firm to the highest bidder, and 
they will receive a percentage share of the proceeds. However, the sale must take place within two 
years, or the asset will revert back to AVU. Hungarians refer to this as privatizing privutizafion, 
and the attractions of this approach are evident when one considers that AVU  employs fewer than 
100 people. 
64. The first such case was that of the Gundel Hotel. 
65. Under the Compensation Law, the maximum amount that a person can receive is Ft 5 million 
($62,500) per piece of  property (par. 4.3 of  the  law). Restitution remains very controversial- 
the Smallholders' party continues to campaign on behalf of  former landowners. Some important 
opposition groups are against restitution. 
66. This process is governed by  law no. 25, 1991, which was only passed in September 1991. 
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this sector is likely to be steady, with probably a slowdown in the rate of  cre- 
ation of new businesses. 
16.2.3  Poland 
Statistics on the number of firms in the Polish private sector are quite good.h7 
However, in order fully to understand these statistics, it is necessary to appreci- 
ate the difference between trade luw companies and individuals who operate 
as firms. Both limited-liability and joint-stock companies are trade law compa- 
nies, which means that they have their legal basis in the amended 1934 Com- 
mercial Code.68  In this paper, I refer to these companies by their common col- 
lective Polish name: spolku. Polish official statistics define a spolka as private 
when at least 5  1 percent is owned by private individuals, and table 16.6 shows 
the recent rapid growth in the number of private spolki. 
Table 16.6 shows both companies founded with only “domestic” capital and 
those that were registered as joint ventures-at  this time requiring a minimum 
investment of $50,000 in “hard currency.”6’ The total number of joint ventures 
rose from 32 in 1988 to 429 in 1989 and 1,645 by the end of  1990. For most 
of the Communist period, it was not practically possible to create new spolki, 
but this changed after  1987 when the Communists tried to encourage some 
private  The number of incorporated spolki rose from 1,275 in 1988 
to 11,693 at the end of  1989 and to 33,239 at the end of  1990. 
The growth of spolki tells only part of the story of the Polish private sector. 
Many private entrepreneurs, even those with substantial businesses, prefer to 
operate as  individual^.^' There are several reasons for this. First, it takes only 
a few days to start an individual business because it is necessary only to com- 
plete a simple registration procedure; in contrast, forming a spolka is relatively 
complex and usually takes time.72  Second, there is no minimum starting capital 
for an individual, whereas for spolki it is now Z1  10 million (about $1,000) for 
a limited-liability  company and Z1  250 million  (about $20,000)  for a joint- 
67. In the Polish statistical system, a company with at least 51 percent of  its shares privately 
owned is defined as private. 
68. A very good translation of the Commercial Code is now available: “The Polish Commercial 
Code: The Law as at  15th August  1991,” translated by  Roman Poplawski and published by  the 
Polish Bar Foundation (Warsaw, 1991). 
69. Not shown in table  16.6 is the number of Poloniu firms, which were a forerunner of joint 
ventures in which only foreigners of Polish origin were supposed to participate. Although these 
firms attracted some attention when first formed, they were never a very  significant part of the 
economy. Polonia firms numbered 46 in  1980, 683 in  1985, 689 in  1988, 727 in  1989, and 862 
in  1990. 
70. A few spolki existed under the Communists, but these had been created before the Commu- 
nists took power, and they were subject to state control. 
71. De jure, one principle advantage of spolki is that they have limited liability. However, inter- 
views with entrepreneurs suggest that, in practice, individuals do not face unlimited liability. 
72. A spolku 2.0.0.  (limited liability company) can be formed in  a few weeks, but a spolku 
akcyjne (joint-stock company) takes significantly longer. 266  Simon Johnson 
Table 16.6  The Number of Private Spolki in Poland: Domestic and Joint Venture 


























































































Total  1 1,693  33,239  38,s 16 
Of which, joint venture  429  1,645  2,840 
Source; Consultant’s report. 
stock ~ompany.’~  Third, if the accounting is handled properly, there are fewer 
taxes on an individual entrepreneur than on a spolku (see below for more de- 
73. Up to 1989, the minimum capital required to start a limited-liability company was ZI  1,000, 
which had been  a significant amount in the 1930s but was worth only a few dollars by  the late 
1980s. It is not unusual to meet people who registered several spolki at that time, some of which 
may still be “sleeping”-if  they are not active, then no taxes need to be paid. 267  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.7  Number of “Individual Entrepreneurs” in Poland 
31 December 1990  30 June 1991  30 September 1991 
Industry  334,613  339,291  348,803 
Construction  165,S4  I  165,428  170,618 
Transportation  6 1,368  569  I3  60,203 
Trade  346,294  456,844  N.A. 
Catering and restaurants  22s  I  I  30,443  N.A. 
Other material services  122,099  122,555  124,768 
Nonmaterial services  83,066  100,923  111,629 
Total  1 .I 35,492  1,272,397  N.A. 
Source: Consultant’s report, based on statistics from the Polish Central Statistical Office 
Note: N.A. J  not available. 
tails). In addition, there was a one-year tax holiday that was available to indi- 
viduals in  1990, as long as they were “newly” involved in wholesale trade.74 
On 3  1 December 1989, official statistics reveal that there were 8 13,485 “un- 
incorporated firms” registered, of which 482,020 were in handicrafts, 7 1,802 
were in trade, and 259,663 were classified as others.75  Fortunately, after this 
date, statistical information was published in a more detailed form, and table 
16.7 shows the number of unincorporated firms (also known as individual en- 
trepreneurs) at the end of  1990, halfway through  1991, and-for  some sec- 
tors-at  the end of the third quarter of 199  I. 
Table 16.7 shows growth, but perhaps not as rapid as might be expected- 
anyone who has visited Warsaw in the last two years can attest to the number 
of  new firms that are apparent. In fact, as table  16.8 shows in some detail, 
during  1990 there were significant numbers of  start-ups and liquidations of 
private firms.”j 
Some of these firms failed because, although they had prospered under the 
Communists, they could not adapt to the completely new economic conditions 
in  1990. For example, the category handicrafts represents mostly traditional 
private-sector activities, which were allowed to operate under the Communists. 
The “net balance” of firm creation in this sector-start-ups  minus suspensions 
74. The actual requirement was that the business was new at the address where it was registered. 
Not  surprisingly, there is anecdotal evidence of businesses simply changing their addresses and 
people active in other sectors-especially  retail trade-switching  to be registered as wholesale 
traders. 
75. Official statistics give the total number of unincorporated firms as 357,000 at the end of 
1980, 418,000 at the end of  1985, 660,000 at the end of  1988, 814,000 at the end of  1989, and 
I, 136,000 at the end of 1990. 
76. A suspended firm does not have to pay taxes but can be quickly reestablished. In interviews, 
entrepreneurs sometimes say that they currently operate one firm but that they have several more 
“sleeping.” Some sleeping firms can be viewed as a form of  tradable option. For  example, in 
1991, I was offered a sleeping firm that was exempt from taxation-because  it had been properly 
registered as a wholesale trader before the end of  1990. Unfortunately, official statistics do not 
appear to record the number of sleeping firms that are reawakened. 268  Simon Johnson 
Table 16.8  Start-up, Liquidation, and Suspension of “Individual Firms” during 
1990 in Poland 
Cumulative Totals, in Thousands (by 
quarter) 
~~ 

















66.9  174.7  314.1  516.2 
33.7  65.6  102.0  154.0 
78.3  81.4  93.4  100.2 
26.5  54.5  85.7  140.6 
19.4  36.4  53.1  75.0 
42.4  43.5  46.2  51.1 
27.3  91.0  180.9  300.7 
4.4  10.9  22.5  41.9 
6.0  8.6  16.4  21.4 
13.1  29.2  47.5  74.9 
9.9  18.3  26.4  37.1 
29.9  29.3  30.8  27.7 
Source: Consultant’s report, based on statistics from the Polish Central Statistical Office. 
and liquidations-was  negative in  the first three quarters of  1990. The most 
striking contrast is with the trade sector, which is composed largely of entre- 
preneurs who entered this activity in 1989 and 1990. Table 16.8 shows a posi- 
tive net balance of firm creation for this sector even in the first quarter of  1990, 
and this net balance rose rapidly during 1990. 
The latest available data are for 30 September 1991, and they show totals of 
44,226 private spolki, 3,5 12 joint ventures, and 1,365,644 individual entrepre- 
neurs. Table 16.9 shows the sectoral composition of the individual entrepre- 
neurs’ activity, their employment; it also shows that about 209,000 of these 
firms have managed to qualify for tax-free status. The latest estimates are that 
the private spolki  and joint ventures together employ 0.5 million people, in 
addition to the 2.5 million shown employed by individual entrepreneurs in ta- 
ble  16.9. The Polish urban labor force is about  12 million people, so these 
numbers imply that the private sector accounts for 25 percent of jobs outside 
agriculture. 
This private-sector growth was not the result of particularly favorable gov- 
ernment tax policies. In fact, Polish tax policies are very similar to those of the 
CSFR. Private firms face the same turnover and social security taxes as state 
firms. Spolki face a corporate income tax of 40 percent, although the effective 269  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.9  Number of Individual Entrepreneurs in Poland on 30 
September 1991 
No. of  Firms 
Sector  Total  Of Which, Taxed  Total Employment 
Industry  348,803 
Construction  170,618 
Transportation  60,203 
Trade  514,778 
Catering  34,845 
Material services  124,768 
















1,365,644  I, 169,s 19  2,477.75 I 
Source: Consultant’s report, based on statistics from the Polish Central Statistical Office. 
Nore: The second column shows the number of firms that were actually subject to taxation 
tax rate may be much lower.77  State firms also pay 40 percent corporate income 
tax, but they are liable to two important taxes from which the private sector is 
exempt.  First, there is the  “excess wage tax,” which  penalizes  firms paying 
wages above a norm set by  the go~ernment.~~  Second, state enterprises must 
also pay  a “dividend”  to the  government,  based on the value of  their  fixed 
assets. 
Individuals operating as a business must pay income tax and also a “leveling 
tax”-if  the entrepreneur’s annual income exceeds Z136 million ($3,000). The 
Polish tax rates are quite high, as can be seen from table 16.10.79  In addition, 
the entrepreneur must pay a 20 percent “wages tax”  and a social insurance 
contribution that is at least Z1238,OOO per month.*O 
Surprisingly, some strange Communist tax regulations still exist with regard 
to individuals operating in the “handicrafts” sector. For this sector, there is also 
a fixed tax per year, with a rate that depends positively on the size of the town 
in which the firm operates. The tax also depends on the number of employ- 
ees-a  tailor who works by himself in a town with more than 50,000 inhabit- 
77. Polish entrepreneurs have found numerous ways to reduce their tax liability. One favored 
route is to have several companies, which employ each other as subcontractors and thus reduce 
their declared profit. 
78. in 1990, there were bitter complaints from the private sector when it was subject to the same 
“excess wage tax” as the state sector. Private firms were fully exempted from this tax only in 1991, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests that they found ways to avoid it even in  1990. 
79. A new, comprehensive income-tax system is supposed to have come into operation on  1 
January 1992, but essential details are still not clear. 
80. For example, a person earning Z1  36,000,000 (about $3,000) would be exempt from the 
leveling tax but would pay 20 percent income tax and at least 8 percent (Z12,856,000, about $260) 
in annual social insurance contribution. This implies an effective tax rate on private entrepreneurs 
of around 28 percent. 270  Simon Johnson 
Table 16.10 
Income (ZI)  Tax Rate 
Tax Rates for Individuals in Poland 
Income tux 
0-26,400,000  20% 
26,400,000-52,800,000 





90,000,000 and over 
ZI  5,280,000 plus 30% of taxable income over ZI  26,400.000 
ZI  13,200,000  plus 40% of taxable income over ZI  52,800,000 
10% of taxable income over ZI  36,000,000 
ZI  I,800,000  plus 20% of taxable income over ZI  54,000,000 
ZI  5,400,000 plu5 30% of taxable income over ZI 72,000,000 
ZI  10,800,000 plus 40% of taxable income over ZI  90.000,OOO 
Source: Consultant’s report. 
NOIP;  There are about ZI  I I.000 to S  I .OO. 
%come  up  to ZI  36,000,000 per year (and per partner where appropriate) is exempt from the 
leveling tax. 
ants must pay Z1 61,000 ($5.00)  per month, whereas a neighboring tailor with 
five employees should pay Z1 858,000 ($78.00) per month.8’ 
In the second half  of  1990, there was a one-year tax holiday  available to 
individuals in wholesale trade, but one of  its main effects seems to have been 
to induce reregistration of already-existing firms. There were also some indi- 
vidual firms, created in September 1990, that were able to avoid paying cus- 
toms duty.82  Owing to a complicated legal situation,  some wholesale  trade 
companies opened in September and October 1990 are exempt from customs 
duties.83 
There  were  some  significant  tax  changes during  1991, which  included 
allowing losses from one year to be included in costs for up to three years. 
There was also an  increase in amortization  allowances. However, more im- 
portant, it remains possible to include almost all investment as a cost of produc- 
tion, as long as it can be bought in units costing less than Z1  1,000,000 (about 
For  this  reason,  leasing  is a  popular  method  of  obtaining  capital 
equipment. 
Turnover tax is currently 20 percent for production activities, 5 percent on 
trade, and 5 percent on services. However, there is a special turnover tax on 
imported goods that must be paid on the border. For some goods, state import- 
ers are able to pay lower tax rates than private  importer^.*^ There are strange 
81. For example, the monthly fixcd tax on a hairdresser with no employees is ZI 49,000 in towns 
with a population up to 5,000 people, ZI  55,000 if the population is between 5,000 and 50,000, 
and ZI  61,000 if the population exceeds 50,000. 
82. This was the result of a very complicated legal situation. 
83. Advertisements have appeared in newspapers that say something along these lines: “I  have 
84. For example, if you want a new set of office furniture, it is best to buy each chair sepxately. 
85. For example, at the end of  1989, a private importer of gasoline paid a tariff of 40 percent, 
a company opened in September 1990, and I am looking for proposals.” 
while a state importer only paid 20 percent. 271  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
anomalies in the turnover-tax system. For example, there is a 15 percent turn- 
over tax on imported paper, but no turnover tax on imported books. 
It is also readily apparent that the Polish banking system did not play a major 
role in private-sector development. The monobank was broken up at the begin- 
ning of  1989 and divided into nine commercial banks, each of which had a 
regional basis.x6  At least fifty private banks were created, but these remain very 
small. In December 1990, state banks were responsible for at least 97 percent 
of all  credit^.^' 
These banks are extremely inefficient in their transfer of money, particularly 
in  and  out of  Poland.  Simple  transactions can take several  weeks  or even 
months. Many private importers who rely on a rapid turnover of goods have 
had to devise ways to send large sums of cash out of the country. Regulation 
of banking activities has also been unsatisfactory-this  was most evident in 
the “Art-B” scandal of the summer of  1991, which resulted in the dismissal 
of  the president of  the National  Bank of  Poland and the arrest of  the senior 
vice-president.8x 
Unfortunately, government credit policy has also not been able to help the 
private sector. Faced with an inflation rate that remained stubbornly high, the 
government has had to maintain quite high nominal interest rates. The bench- 
mark National Bank of  Poland refinance rate peaked at 432 percent per year 
in January 1990 and then fell steadily to 34 percent in June 1990. However, it 
rose again from October 1990 to February 1991, reaching 72 percent per year. 
By October  1991, it was down to 40 percent. Loan rates were usually  about 
one-fifth higher than the refinance rate. 
Calculating real interest rates when both nominal rates and inflation are high 
is difficult, but the following general conclusions are possible. Very high infla- 
tion meant negative real interest rates at the beginning of  1990, at the same 
time as nominal rates were shockingly high. In June 1990, monthly inflation 
was down to 3.4 percent (equivalent to 49 percent per year). Monthly inflation 
has remained in  the 2-6  percent range since that time (annualized rates of 
27-100  percent), which means that the real interest rate moves from positive 
to negative from month to month. 
It seems likely the continued high level of nominal interest rates, combined 
with instability in the real rate, discourages private borrowing. Credits for pri- 
vate firms and individuals were 17 percent of total bank credits on 31 March 
1991 and 21 percent on 30 September 1991. There is also anecdotal evidence 
86. There are also six specialist banks, e.g., one for food processing and another for the financ- 
ing of  foreign trade. 
87. There are plans to privatize these commercial banks, probably beginning with Bank Slaski 
and Bank Wielkopolski. 
88. Art-B might be the only private firm that has benefited from the inefficiency of the Polish 
banking system. Art-B shifted money between banks rapidly in order to earn interest at several 
banks simultaneously-this  mechanism is referred to in Polish as an oscylator. It was also able to 
obtain a large amount in bank loans that were not properly secured. The owners of this company 
subsequently escaped the country. 272  Simon Johnson 
Table 16.11  Ownership of Polish Housing Stock (% shares) 
Cooperatives  State Enterprises  State  Private 
Total  24.3  12.1  19.3  41.1 
Urban  36.1  11.4  21.1  23.4 
Rural  .5  13.5  3.  I  76.7 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1988. 
of an informal market for loans in hard currency, which have the advantage of 
carrying a low, stable rate of interest. 
Especially after the recent Art-B scandal, banks have become very cautious 
about lending to private firms and often require more than 100 percent security 
in the form of  liquid assets-such  as bank deposits. There is some available 
collateral in the hands of the private sector, principally housing. As table 16.11 
shows, the private sector owns more than three-quarters of housing in the coun- 
tryside and almost one-quarter in towns. In addition, these data are from 1988, 
and since that time some people have bought  their  cooperative  apartments. 
Unfortunately,  official housing statistics have become increasingly unreliable 
because, although it is permitted to buy and sell private and cooperative apart- 
ments, there are legal restrictions and tax regulations, which means that a great 
deal of  this activity takes place in a disguised  Probably  another 10 
percent of the urban housing stock has become private through some form of 
market transaction. However, this progress should not be confused with plans 
to privatize “state” housing-controlled  by local government-which  have not 
yet produced significant results. 
It is possible to borrow against the security of a private apartment, but banks 
require that no one other than the owner is registered as living there. This form 
of  credit is easier  to obtain  in the countryside,  but  it  still requires  a lot of 
administrative work, and the property must be properly evaluated. State banks 
apparently do not welcome this kind of work. 
Most agricultural land is privately owned. Official statistics for 1990 show 
individuals owning 76 percent of arable land, with state farms owning 18.6 
percent  and cooperatives having 3.7 percent.  More than 3.5 million people 
work on private farms, while around 800,000 work on state and cooperative 
farms. 
There has been some privatization of state assets, which has helped private- 
sector development. Efforts to sell state enterprises in auctions have definitely 
not been very successful. Instead, privatization by “liquidation” has been more 
widespread-by  December 1991, at least 875 firms had undergone this pro- 
89. The main  problem is how  to minimize the sales tax when  an apartment changes hands. 
Various techniques are employed, including using fictitious names and “exchanging”  apartments 
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cess, which usually means that they end up being owned by  their employees. 
The employees have to provide 20 percent of the firm as a down payment and 
can buy the rest of the firm from the state in installments. However, these firms 
are relatively small, and the total amount of privatized  firms so far probably 
accounts for no more than 5 percent of total assets of state firms. 
The privatization of retail space has proceeded much more smoothly. Under 
the Communist regime,  a large number of shops were in principle privately 
owned but in practice controlled by a state agency of some kind. Early in 1990, 
private owners were able to regain this property. In addition, from May 1990, 
newly elected non-Communist municipalities had the right to dispose of shops 
that had been state owned. Most of these municipalities were short of money, 
and this encouraged them to auction off the movable property of shops quickly, 
along with fairly short-term leases for the building-usually  the leases are for 
a few years.9o By the end of  1990, private firms operated  65 percent  of  all 
shops but only 27 percent of total retail space-some  large cooperative and 
state stores remain. However, after the first six months of  1991, 75 percent of 
shops were privately run, and this accounted for 80 percent of retail sales. The 
total number of  private  shops in mid-1991 was 456,000, up from 346,300 a 
year before. 
Although most agricultural land remained private during communism in Po- 
land, there was substantial nationalization of  urban pr~perty.~'  The situation 
with regard to reprivatization  remains unclear, and there is not yet definitive 
legislation on this point.92  However, it is relatively simple to recover property 
that was taken illegally by the Communists-that  is, in breach of the Commu- 
nists'  own laws. Typical types of property are mills, buildings, land, and drug- 
stores. 
The Polish private sector appears to be doing well, although some problems 
definitely remain. Taxes are high, credit conditions are unfavorable, and priva- 
tization has been quite slow. Nevertheless, there continues to be rapid growth 
both in the number of private firms, incorporated and unincorporated, and in 
private-sector employment. 
16.2.4  Comparison 
In order to compare the relative importance of private-sector  activity, table 
16.12 gives data for estimated urban labor forces: 4 million in Hungary, 7 mil- 
lion in the CSFR, and 12 million in Poland. We use this measure rather than 
total population as the basis for comparison because around one-quarter of the 
Polish work force is in agriculture-the  average total employment in Poland 
in  1990 was  16.5 million, but employment in agriculture accounted  for 4.4 
90. There have been complaints that municipal authorities raise rents repeatedly even when this 
91. One estimate is that 20,740 enterprises were nationalized in the period 1945-59. 
92. There remains debate about whether the 1946 Nationalization Act should be accepted as le- 
is not allowed under the lease. 
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Table 16.12  Comparison of Current Government Prices 
CSFR  Hungary  Poland 
General indicators 
Population (million) 
Labor force (urban) (million) 
No. of privatc firms: 
Incorporated 
Unincorporated (million) 
Sectors of private activity (% 
of registered 
entrepreneurs in a sector) 
Industry (%) 
Trade (70) 
Equal legal treatment? 
Macroeconomic situation: 
Substantial convertibility 




Tax rates (%) 
Corporate income 
Private income (see also 
table 16.13) 
Turnover 
Social security tax (%) 
Wage tax (per employee) (%) 
Excess wage tax 





Capital needed for limited 
Tax advantages for joint 





Dominant state banks? 
Preferential interest rates? 
Nominal interest rates in 1991 
Inflation 1991 (%) 
Private share of total 
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Table 16.12  (continued) 
CSFR  Hungary  Poland 
Privatization progress 
Large companies  Begins in spring  Under way  Repeated 
1992  and gradual  delays 
% privatized at end of  1991  A few1  10%'/25%'  < 10% 
Shops and restaurants  10  10  60-80 















Sources: Discussed in text and other tables. 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
"To $1,000  "any  exceptions. 
hTop  rate.  hUsually. 
'200%-750%.  but not if small.  'Valued in dollars. 
"Yes for state-owned enterprises.  'Foreign deals. 
<Restricted.  'Fully. 
'Recent.  'Corporatized. 
million (Rocznik  Statystyczny 1991, p. 93, table 2 [174]). The fraction of labor 
working in Hungarian and CSFR agriculture is much lower. 
In terms of the number of incorporated private businesses, Hungary clearly 
has the lead, with  1.3 incorporated  businesses per  100 people in the urban 
labor force, while Poland has 0.3 and the CSFR only 0.1. But, in terms of the 
relative number of unincorporated businesses, the CSFR surprisingly has the 
lead, with  16 such firms per 100, while both Poland and Hungary have 13. 
However, we suspect that a large number of  registered entrepreneurs in the 
CSFR are actually working for other people and declaring themselves to be 
self-employed as a way to avoid the wage tax. Unfortunately, it is very hard to 
know how much these different private sectors contribute to national output. 
One set of estimates for the share of the private sector in GDP is 14.7 percent 
for Poland, 16.6 percent for Hungary, and 3.1 percent for the CSFR (Brandsma 
1991).93  In terms of share in urban employment, we estimate that, in both Po- 
land and Hungary, the private sector now provides 20-25  percent while, in the 
CSFR, it accounts for less than 5 
93. This same source estimates that the private sector contributes to GDP 8.9 percent in Bul- 
garia, 3.5 percent in the former East Germany, 2.5 percent in Romania, and 2.5 percent in the 
former Soviet Union. 
94. Although it is not directly comparable to Eastern Europe's private sector, we should note 
that the small business sector in Western Europe contributes between 32 percent (in the United 
Kingdom) and 46 percent (in Germany) to GNP. 276  Simon Johnson 
Our conclusion is that, compa:ed  to the CSFR, and implicitly to other post- 
Communist countries, the private sector is relatively strong in both Hungary 
and Poland. However, this strength is manifest differently in the two countries. 
We therefore have two phenomena to explain. First, why are Hungary and PO- 
land ahead of the CSFR in terms of private-sector development? Second, why 
has the private sector in Hungary developed in a corporate form, whereas in 
Poland a much larger part is unincorporated? 
Table 16.12 summarizes the different measures of government policy that 
were discussed above. With regard to macroeconomic policy and basic legal 
framework, all three countries are very similar. For example, all have substan- 
tially  liberalized  trade  while  still  having-at  the end of  199  1  -some  trade 
restrictions. In all three countries, private business is now subject to a commer- 
cial code that draws heavily on the German-Austrian model and that is related 
to their prewar experiences. 
Government tax policy cannot really explain the differences between these 
three countries, As table  16.12 shows, corporate income tax rates in all three 
countries are remarkably  similar. Table  16.13 provides  a comparison  of the 
rates of  taxation on individual  entrepreneurs-we  calculated  the rate of  tax 
that an individual must pay at various levels of income, converted into dollars. 
Table 16.13 suggests that tax rates are highest at all incomc levels in Poland, 
lowest  for  low  incomes  in  Hungary,  and  lowest  for  mid-range  incomes 
($3,000-$5,000) in the CSFR. Of course, table 16.13 does not reflect other tax 
legislation, such as accelerated depreciation and the ability to deduct business 
expenses from taxable income. As we discussed above, it seems easiest to re- 
duce taxable income in Poland and hardest in the CSFR-although  the CSFR 
tax  code is currently  being revised to allow more deductions. Nevertheless, 
table 16.13 suggests the interesting conclusion that the Polish registered entre- 
preneurs have prospered, not because of favorable tax rates, but despite very 
high rates. 
In terms of credit conditions, as measured by nominal and real rates of inter- 
est, it appears that the CSFR had an advantage, in the form of low real interest 
rates, during the first half of 1990, but now its real rates are very high. Unfortu- 
nately, we could not obtain information about the extent of credit rationing to 
private firms, and this may be more important than the posted lending rate. 
Hungary may have the best combination-nominal  interest rates roughly  in 
line with inflation and an established pattern of lending by some state banks to 
private firms. The continued instability of real and nominal zloty interest rates 
in Poland should probably be considered a major disadvantage. 
Small privatization appears to be proceeding  significantly  faster in Poland 
than in either the CSFR or Hungary. This may be because there is not much 
capital in the hands of private business in the CSFR and because the auction 
process has been centrally controlled in Hungary. However, in our opinion, the 
successful auction of  leases to shops is an effect rather than a cause of  the 
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Table 16.13  Comparative Income-Tax Rates 
Effective Tax Rate (%) 






15  4  20 
18  20  22 
21  27  32 
27  37  50 
55  50  80 
Source; Author’s calculations based on tables 16.1, 16.5, and 16.10. 
Nore; We  used approximate exchange rates of  Ft  SO.OO/$l  .OO,  KEs 29.00/$1 .00,  and 21  I 1  ,OOO/ 
$I .oo. 
Our comparative evidence has raised an important question. Why has the 
private sector been relatively successful in Poland? Economic reform in Poland 
began more recently than in Hungary and brought with it high inflation and 
other macroeconomic problems. How did the Polish private sector manage to 
grow in this environment? Is there something different about the Polish pri- 
vate sector? 
16.2.5  What Is Different about Poland? 
Why has the Polish private sector done relatively well in its unusual, unin- 
corporated form? In our opinion, the answer lies in the way the Polish economy 
was reformed. The Polish private sector is the product of a particular sequence 
of events, primarily due to changing government policy. 
The relaxation of controls over the private sector came earlier in Poland than 
in the CSFR. It is true that the new wave of spolki creation did not really begin 
until  1988, but since the mid-1980s there had been gradual liberalization  of 
private economic activity-for  example, at this time new cooperatives were 
created  that  were  essentially  private  firms  (Johnson  and Loveman  1993).‘j5 
There was a rapid growth in individual international trade by Poles-the  gov- 
ernment did not impose any restrictions  on most people’s travel.”h In fact, it 
was  quite common for young  Poles  to work  in  Western  Europe for a few 
months each year.”  Foreign travel was much harder for Hungarians and citi- 
zens of Czechoslovakia. 
These experiences  matter  because  it  was  in these  small ways that  Poles 
learned about nonstate business, acquired modest amounts of capitaland made 
connections  with the outside world. Most important,  it was possible to earn 
95. Some of these firms were linked to the Solidarity movement, which at this time was illegal 
96. The government did restrict travel-usually  by  denying a passport-to  people  whom  it 
97. It is not uncommon to find well-educated people who worked as manual laborers at harvest 
and “underground.” 
regarded as its political enemies. 
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very high rates of return on some imports. The best example is the case of 
computers,  in which people could begin  by  buying  computer equipment by 
mail order from abroad at a cost of a few hundred or thousand dollars, sell this 
equipment to state firms at prices that implied a return of several hundred per- 
cent,  and  by  reinvesting  in  other  computer-related  imports  accumulate- 
within  a few years-hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars.98  There was a rapid 
accumulation of capital, both financial and human, that was unique to Poland. 
The Communists also tried  to rebuild  some legitimacy  by  widening  the 
scope of  private-sector  activity.  In  particular,  the  last  Communist govern- 
ment-headed  by  Mieczyslaw  Rakowski-passed  legislation  that  by  early 
1989 had essentially removed all legal and most administrative barriers on the 
private sector. 
However, these changes brought little in terms of visible benefits while the 
Communists retained power. Their macroeconomic policy was very unsuccess- 
ful and caused rapid inflation despite partial price controls.99 The result was 
terrible shortages and grossly distorted prices (Lipton and Sachs 1990), a situa- 
tion that exacerbated the supply problems of the private sector. Circumventing 
import controls helped private businesspeople make money on semilegal trade, 
but these controls constrained the speed with which this trade could develop. 
The details of the political transformation and the construction of the eco- 
nomic reform of  1990 have been explored at length in other papers, and the 
main results are clear. Almost overnight, there was an end to shortages, and 
the zloty became convertible at a stable exchange rate.loo  It became possible to 
import freely, and private traders moved rapidly to do just that. 
Two points are important. The first is that the reform program did not have 
to change much in terms of the legal treatment of the private sector. The most 
important steps had already been taken. Second, the stabilization of the econ- 
omy and rapid liberalization of foreign trade had a major stimulative effect on 
the private sector. 
As table 16.8 above shows, not all the private sector was favorably affected, 
and many  firms  that  had  prospered  under  the previous  price system found 
themselves unable to survive at world prices. It is also true that the first quarter 
of  1990 showed only limited private-sector growth. But this growth soon be- 
came apparent-table  16.8 shows that the total net balance of individual firm 
creation improved every quarter in 1990. 
98. The story of Polish computers is the subject of ongoing research by Piotr Strzalkowski and 
99. For a model of the acceleration of Polish inflation, see Johnson (1991). 
100. Strictly speaking, the zloty became convertible for legal persons only on current account- 
in order to obtain foreign currency, they had  to present a valid  invoice from a foreign exporter. 
However, the zloty was fully convertible for private persons at  legal, private exchange offices 
(kanturs)  . 
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16.3  Field Research 
16.3.1  Methodology 
It is very hard to provide a full explanation for the relatively rapid growth of 
the Polish private sector. However, the characteristics of Polish firms that have 
had  some success may  shed some light on this issue. Unfortunately,  to this 
time these characteristics  have nowhere been carefully  measured. There are 
anecdotes, analyses of clusters of successful firms (e.g., Johnson and Loveman 
1993), and some surveys of  private firms that are based on samples that are 
biased-in  the sense that they oversample firms that are doing badly. (These 
surveys cannot yet be cited.) 
For this reason, we decided to collect our own primary data by interviewing 
private-sector entrepreneurs. In particular, we wanted to interview a represen- 
tative sample of “active”  firms.”” We emphasize the word active because  in 
Poland there are many registered firms that exist only on paper and that can 
hardly be considered the basis for sustained private-sector development.102  The 
easiest way to construct a sample is to obtain a list of limited-liability and joint- 
stock companies because these must be registered with a court.In3  However, 
this would  have implied  ignoring  those  large  and  successful  Polish  private 
firms that, because of tax incentives, had registered as individuals engaged in 
wholesale trade in  1990. 
Our personal experience with Polish entrepreneurs suggests that they select 
the property form that has the most favorable tax conditions at the time of start- 
up and that, if tax incentives switch, they are willing to reregister their firms. 
For these reasons, we decided not to use property form as a selection criterion 
for inclusion of firms in the sample. However, this created another problem- 
the population of Polish firms contains an enormous number of private individ- 
uals who have very small operations, and we did not wish these observations 
to dominate our sample. 
For this reason, we chose to draw our sample from a very specific popula- 
tion-private  Polish firms that advertise. In our opinion, firms that advertise 
are likely to be active. The details of  how  we obtained information  on this 
population is contained in the appendix, which also describes how we divided 
our sample by  sector of  activity and ensured that our sample had the same 
101. A short while ago, Polish entrepreneurs were unwilling to speak with outsiders. This situa- 
tion changed at the beginning of the economic reform program. A good example is that, in 1990, 
the Central Statistical Office suddenly found that entrepreneurs became much more willing to 
respond to requests for information, and some also sent in long letters of comments. 
102. For example, there are about  130,000 companies in Warsaw, a city with a population of 
around 1.8 million. This ratio of 7 companies per 100 inhabitants is rather high-the  usual number 
in a Western city is around 4.  However, many of these Polish firms do not operate on a regular 
basis. 
103. This was the method used in one large study whose results we have read but that we are 
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Table 16.14  Survey of Private Companies in Warsaw, December 1991: 
Breakdown of  the 294 Interviewed Private Companies, by Sector 
Traditional services (mainly handicrafts) 
















proportion in each sector as existed in the economy as a whole. Table 16.14 
shows the sectoral composition of firms in our sample. 
Selected firms were interviewed using a questionnaire  with fifty-six ques- 
tions, focusing  on five sets of  issues, each of  which examines an important 
aspect of the firms' operations. We asked about several measures of the firms' 
size, the career of  the entrepreneur, the sources of finance for this business, 
indicators of business strategy, and perceptions of the general economic envi- 
ronment in Poland. 
16.3.2  Results 
Because of  space limitations, we provide here only some principal, overall 
results of our survey. More detailed results, broken down by  sector, are under 
preparation  for a  separate  paper.'04 For this  paper,  we  have  divided  up  re- 
sponses between four tables, and we do not show answers to all questions, only 
those that most closely address the issues raised in this paper. The order in 
which responses are given is not necessarily the same as the order in which 
questions were asked.'05 
Table 16.15 shows several indicators of firm size that we chose to use. Most 
of the firms in our sample are quite small in terms of employment-only  forty- 
three employ more than twenty people. At the same time, sixty-nine firms had 
turnover above Z1  1,000  million ($100,000)  in 1990-a  significant amount un- 
der Polish conditions. In almost all sampled firms, turnover was higher in 1991 
than in  1990, although this is hard to evaluate because there was also substan- 
tial inflation  during both years. In terms of profitability, there are really two 
poles: in both  1990 and  1991, sixty to seventy firms earned less than Z1  50 
104. These sectors were constructed by  Piotr Strzalkowski of  MCR  Research from his data 
base, in which there are seventy-six categories. 
105. For example, previous experience of MCR Research suggested that entrepreneurs would 
answer questions about their finances, but only if they were asked after the interview was  well 
under way-so  they had already built a relationship with the interviewer. This idea appears to be 
confirmed by our results-a  surprising number of entrepreneurs answered our financial questions 
very precisely. 281  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.15 
How many employees do you have? 
Descriptive Information for Sample 
0-2  (81 cases) 
3-5  (78 cases) 
6-20  (92 cases) 
More than 20 (43 cases) 
Up to 100 (48 cases) 
100-200 (18 cases) 
200-500  (29 cases) 
500-1,000  (28 cases) 
1,000-10.000 (44 cases) 
10,000-100,OOO  (21 cases) 
More than 100,000 (4 cases) 
Up to 100 (35 cases) 
100-200 (9 cases) 
200-500  (24 cases) 
500-1,OOO  (34 cases) 
1,000-10,000 (84 cases) 
10,000-100,OOO  (30 cases) 
More than  100,OOO  (4 cases) 
Up to 50 (74 cases) 
50-100  (27 cases) 
100-200 (25 cases) 
200-300  (2 cases) 
300-400  (3 cases) 
400-1,000 (4 cases) 
1,000 and higher (29 cases) 
Up to 50 (63 cases) 
50-100  (34 cases) 
100-200 ( 19 cases) 
200-300  (15 cases) 
300-400  (6  cases) 
400-500  (6 cases) 
500-1,000  (9 cases) 
1,000 and higher (27 cases) 
1 (7 cases) 
2-5  (28 cases) 
6-10  (21 cases) 
More than 10 (227 cases) 
Local (65 cases) 
National (105  cases) 
National and foreign (54 cases) 
Only foreign (3 cases) 
What was your turnover in 1990 (in millions of zloty, with about ZI  10,000/$1.00)? 
What was your turnover in  1991 (in millions of zloty, with about Z1  11,000/$1.00)? 
What were your profits in  1990 (millions of zloty)? 
What were your profits in 1991 (millions of zloty)? 
How many customers do you have? 
The market for your product(s) is: 282  Simon Johnson 
million  ($5,000),  while  over  thirty  firms  earned more than  Z1  400  million 
($40,000). Note  that,  while  most  sampled firms  answered  most  questions, 
about half of all firms declined to answer questions about profits. 
Without doubt, by Western standards most of these randomly selected “ac- 
tive” Polish private firms are small. However, table  16.15 shows that it is not 
correct to characterize them as tied to one state firm or as serving only a local 
market. The vast majority of all firms reported having more than ten customers, 
and in 105 cases entrepreneurs said that their market was “national.” Surpris- 
ingly, fifty-seven of  these private firms (19 percent  of  our sample) reported 
exporting some goods. 
We  were interested in the entrepreneur’s family background because it has 
been suggested that this is an important factor in determining who becomes an 
entrepreneur. Table 16.16 shows some interesting evidence in this regard: in 
about one-third of  all cases, the entrepreneur’s family had run another business 
in the past ten years. Interestingly, however, only forty-eight respondents said 
that their firm was established  “as a family tradition.” We took this to mean 
that a family  background  in private business  is conducive to entry into the 
private sector but not necessarily into exactly the same activity. 
The vast majority of entrepreneurs  replied that this firm was the result of 
either their initiative or that of a partner. Only five firms were spin-offs of some 
kind from another firm. However,  about one-third  of  the entrepreneurs  had 
worked in the private sector before establishing their own firm, and about the 
same number had held a management position in a state firm. This indicates 
that one-third of  sampled entrepreneurs either held no previous employment 
or were workers in state firms. 
According to the responses shown in table 16.17, most of the entrepreneurs 
started with money saved from earnings in Poland. In forty-two cases (14 per- 
Table 16.16  The Entrepreneur’s Background 
Has your family run another busincss in the past ten years? 
Yes (101 cases) 
No ( 190 cases) 
Was the company established: 
On the interviewee’s and/or a partner’s initiative? 
On the initiative of another company? 
As a family tradition? 
Yes (227 cases) 
Yes (5  cases) 
Yes (48 cases) 
Yes (  1 12 cases) 
No (155 cases) 
Yes (1  11 cases) 
No (1  66 cases) 
Did you work in private sector before establishing your own company? 
Did you ever have a management position in a state firm or a cooperative? 283  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.17  Financial Information 
What was the source of your initial capital (respondents could give more than one answer)? 
Domestic earnings (214 cases) 
Earnings abroad (42 cases) 
Loans from family and friends (80 cases) 
Bank credit (34 cases) 
Have you applied for credit in the past two years? 
Yes, successfully (71 cases) 
Yes, unsuccessfully (32 cases) 
No (1  83 cases) 
If you obtained credit, was it: 
In zlotys? 
Yes  (62 cases) 
In hard currency? 
Yes (13 cases) 
Yes  (130 cases) 
No (1  62 cases) 
Yes  (92 cases) 
No (200 cases) 
With own funds (256 cases) 
With bank credit (42 cases) 
With supplier credit (76 cases) 
To  increase turnover (129 cases) 
To purchase fixed assets (143 cases) 
To pay dividends to shareholders (9 cases) 
To build reserves (46 cases) 
To make outside investments (stocks, bonds etc.) (21 cases) 
Other (72 cases) 
Increase turnover (162 cases) 
Purchase fixed assets (126 cases) 
Stop using bank credits (34 cases) 
Increase inventory (48 cases) 
Make long-term deposits (17 cases) 
Increase financial reserves (48 cases) 
Buy securities (14 cases) 
Pay dividends (9 cases) 
Do you have any debtors (trade credit)? 
Do you have any creditors (trade credit)'? 
How do you finance turnover (respondents could give more than one answer)? 
How do you use your profits at present (respondent can choose more than one answer)? 
If your profits increase, you will (respondent can choose more than one answer): 
cent of the sample), they had savings from foreign earnings. About the same 
number of entrepreneurs  started out with bank loans, and eighty people re- 
ported using some money from family and friends. 
Interestingly, table 16.17 also shows that relatively few entrepreneurs have 
ever applied for credit-only  one-third of our sample. These numbers indicate 
that  two-thirds  of  Polish  private businesspeople do not  even  try  to borrow 
money. Many firms also operate without giving or receiving trade credit-162 284  Simon Johnson 
interviewees said that their firms had no debtors, and 200 said that they had 
no creditors. Of those  who had  obtained credit, thirteen  said that it was in 
hard currency. 
Table 16.17 shows that most private firms reinvest their profits. Around half 
said that they used profits to increase turnover, and 162 said that they would 
do that if profits increased. Fixed assets are purchased out of profits by  143, 
and  126 would do the  same with  higher profits.  Only twenty-one presently 
make investments outside the firm. Clearly, the growth of these private busi- 
nesses is based on their own retained earnings. 
Table 16.18 shows that most of these entrepreneurs consider their competi- 
tion to be either other private companies or black marketeers. When asked to 
name the main three barriers  to rising sales, limited demand was named  by 
163. More  interesting,  however,  is  the  fact  that-adding  across  the  first-, 
second-,  and  third-named  barriers-a  lack  of  employees  adversely  affects 
thirty-eight  firms (13 percent  of  the sample). We  believe that this indicates 
both the lack of  skilled  labor in Poland and the fact that the Warsaw labor 
market is actually quite tight. 
Very few of these firms use consulting firms or lawyers, but just under half 
use an accountant, at least part-time. The hiring of accountants is easy to ex- 
plain-Polish  tax regulations are complex, and one bookkeeping error could 
bring on a much-feared investigation by the tax authorities. 
16.3.3  Analysis 
The information from our sample of  Polish firms confirms the broad picture 
of  private-sector  development  that we outlined  above. In  addition, we have 
uncovered some data that confirm or clarify prevalent opinions about the Polish 
private sector. 
Where  did  these  private  entrepreneurs  come from? About  one-third had 
families with business backgrounds. Most of them started their firms them- 
selves, with their own money. Where did they get the experience and the capital 
necessary to do this? For about half, the answer is previous work in the private 
sector, and slightly more than a third had previous work experience as manag- 
ers in the state sector. The liberalization of this sector under the Communists 
appears to have had useful, lasting effects. 
The private sector provides its own capital. Most of these entrepreneurs do 
not borrow money, and their growth is based on reinvested profits. This is con- 
sistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the rapid growth of the Polish 
private sector since the beginning of  1990 was due to the existence of  high 
rates of profit in some activities-particularly  wholesale trade. 
For all their successes, most Polish private firms remain small and compete 
mostly with other private firms. As expected, it is now apparent that some will 
continue to grow while others will remain small. But it is far from clear how 
fast firms can grow when that growth is based only on retained profits. Yet 
there is little credit available to the private sector, and the much-vaunted priva- 285  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
Table 16.18  Strategy 
Who are your main competitors? 
Black marketeers (73 cases) 
Other private companies (153 cases) 
State owned companies (32 cases) 
Cooperatives (12 cases) 
Foreign firms (27 cases) 
Imports (34 cases) 
None (36 cases) 
What are the three main barriers to increasing your sales (rank them in ordtr)? 
First: 
Lack of  orders (163 cases) 
Lack of employees (14 cases) 
Taxes (27 cases) 
LegaVadministrative (14 cases) 
Other (53 cases) 
Lack of orders (29 cases) 
Lack of employees (20 cases) 
Taxes (53 cases) 
LegaVadministrative (35 cases) 
Other (27 cases) 
Lack of  orders (1  1 cases) 
Lack of  employees (4  cases) 
Taxes ( 12 cases) 
LegaVadministrative  (1  2 cases) 
Other (24 cases) 
Never ( 130 cases) 
Sometimes (3-10  times) per year (72 cases) 
Once a month (12 cases) 
Several times a month (26 cases) 
Every day (50 cases) 
Do you employ a bookkeeper? 
Yes (136 cases) 
No ( 153 cases  j 
Second: 
Third: 
How often do you use the services of  lawyers? 
tization program has so far had little effect on already-existing private busi- 
nesses. 
16.4  Conclusions 
Our evidence has shown considerable differences among the conditions of 
the private sectors in the CSFR, Hungary, and Poland. The private sector has 
done well in Hungary, in part because there was a steady liberalization of the 
private sector over a long period. The Polish private sector has also done well, 
primarily because it was able to grow in the midst of an unstable macroeco- 
nomy. Private firms in the CSFR remain small and have a long way to go. 286  Simon Johnson 
The recent history of economic reforms-in  the last ten to twenty years- 
continues to shape the fortunes of the private sectors in these countries. At first 
this seems strange because their Communist  regimes for the most part  SUC- 
ceeded in imposing a very similar economic structure on all three countries.’”‘ 
Although further research is needed, our working conclusion is that the Com- 
munist economic reforms of the 1980s established-probably  inadvertently- 
the basis for sustained Polish private-sector development. Reforms conducted 
at the same time in Hungary had similar-but  probably more intentional- 
effects, but the form taken by the private sector in Poland and Hungary was 
rather different. What were the important differences between the Hungarian 
and the Polish economic reforms? 
In Poland, there was much more liberalization of  travel and informal im- 
porting. There was also, from the beginning of 1988, a much worse macroeco- 
nomic situation in which the government lost control over the inflation rate. 
Permissive legislation was introduced at the same time as there were enormous 
discrepancies between prices inside and outside Poland. It was individuals who 
made money  and gained experience  in this situation. Corporate forms were 
sometimes convenient, but they were never essential to private-sector develop- 
ment. Because the Hungarian economy remained more tightly controlled, sim- 
ilar “hothouse” conditions were never created, and private-sector development 
was more even paced. 
This helps explain why the unincorporated private sector is stronger in Po- 
land whereas the private corporate sector is more developed in Hungary. Indi- 
vidual enterprise  is stimulated more by  the availability  of foreign travel and 
small-scale import opportunities.  The relatively  stable macroeconomic  envi- 
ronment of Hungary means that more capital is needed to start a private firm, 
and this requires the use of a corporate form. Moreover, as our survey research 
shows, Polish  entrepreneurs  live  and grow  on internally  generated  capital, 
partly because the capital market is not well developed. The capital market is 
better developed in Hungary, and this permits larger-scale private enterprise. 
(However, in order to make a deeper analysis of the Hungarian private sector, 
we would need to conduct a survey similar to that in Poland.) 
What is the secret of the relative success of the private sector in Poland? In 
part, it was the historical  sequence of  events. The Communists’ partially re- 
formed economy was a good place to learn how to do business. The economic 
reform program rapidly changed the economy, to the relative benefit of small, 
flexible firms that could adjust quickly. The achievements to date have been so 
remarkable that it is almost possible to speak of a Polish private-sector miracle. 
But one element is still missing: there is no bank credit at low nominal and 
real interest rates. 
There are few obvious conclusions for the CSFR and other countries that 
106. It is true that agriculture was never successfully collectivized in Poland, but we have not 
seen evidence that private agriculture was the basis for rapid growth in the urban Polish private 
sector. In fact, private farmers have been among the most vociferous opponents of the economic 
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abandoned communism before their private sector was significantly developed. 
Some of these countries now have similar policies as Poland but have not yet 
had such rapid growth. It makes no sense to suggest that they try to create a 
Polish-style “hothouse” because these conditions also involve terrible macro- 
economic imbalances-and  these helped bring down the Polish Communist 
regime. The CSFR has little choice but to maintain its existing policy combina- 
tion: attempt to hold down inflation, maintain an open economy, provide mod- 
est tax incentives, and keep credit reasonably priced. Some measures to pro- 
vide special assistance to small business have worked in industrial countries 
and have already been proposed  for the CSFR (see Rondinelli  1991). In es- 
sence, this implies trying to follow the Hungarian path of  gradual and more 
steady  private-sector  growth,  although without  the Hungarian  acceleration 
after 1989. 
There has been discussion of various innovative ways to stimulate the private 
sector in post-Communist countries. A significant amount of unmortgaged pri- 
vate property exists in these countries. There may be legal changes that would 
allow an  individual  to sign  away his or her protection  from eviction-this 
would  facilitate the development of  mortgage  credit.  Policymakers  are also 
aware that accelerating small privatization would definitely help put physical 
capital in the hands of  private business. Furthermore,  following successes in 
selling  shops and restaurants,  in  Poland and  Hungary  measures  have been 
taken  to promote  a separate track for the privatization of  “small”  industrial 
assets. However, given their current  situation, it will be hard  for the CSFR 
and other Communist countries to emulate the success of either Hungary’s or 
Poland’s private sector. 
These conclusions suggest partial answers to the three questions raised in 
the  second  paragraph  of  the  introduction.  There  are  measures  that  post- 
Communist  governments  can  and  have  used  to  accelerate  private-sector 
growth, but the effectiveness of these measures depends on how much the pri- 
vate sector grew under the Communist regime. There are at least two paths to 
private-sector  growth, one typified  by Hungary  and the other by Poland. In 
both cases, the  results  so far have been  impressive, but it remains unclear 
whether they provide the basis for a modem, industrial economy. 
Appendix 
Sample Selection for Polish Entrepreneurs 
Our full sample consists of 294 companies that were interviewed in Warsaw in 
the last three  weeks of  November and the first week of  December 1991.’” 
107. Most of  the detailed work  described here was performed by Piotr Strzalkowski and  his 
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These companies were  selected  from a data base of  about 3,000 firms that 
advertised themselves in the Polish press in the last two months of  1990. For 
obvious reasons, we were able to interview only those firms that were still in 
business at the end of  1991. Interviews were conducted by  a team of twenty 
people, trained and supervised by MCR research. 
The list of firms that advertise was obtained from Gazeta Wyborcza, which 
is available throughout  Poland and has seventeen local editions. Three other 
newspapers  were  used:  Rzeczpospolita, Zycie  Warszawa (60 percent  of  the 
copies are sold in Warsaw), and Kontakt. Kontakt is not a popular daily but 
rather a specialized paper in which manufacturing firms advertise. It was in- 
cluded because manufacturing firms less often advertise in daily newspapers- 
most of this advertising is done by firms offering nonmaterial services, particu- 
larly trade. 
In order to qualify for inclusion in the data base, a firm  had to give in its 
advertisement its name, address, and telephone number. In many Polish adver- 
tisements, a firm gives only its phone number or its name and phone number. 
We judged these “firms” more likely to be one-off trade shipments, and we did 
not wish to include them in our sample. 
Our category  traditional services  comprised primarily  services  in  which 
private-sector activity had been allowed before  1990. These include automo- 
bile repair, miscellaneous repairs, shoemaking, tailoring, and carpentry. These 
need to be contrasted  with modern services, such as consulting, advertising, 
accounting,  and finance, which the private  sector has started doing only re- 
cently. Our other categories of firms were production,  transport, restaurants, 
retail trade, and wholesale trade. 
With the data base prepared, we then consulted official statistics (published 
by the State Statistical Office, GUS) to determine the proportions of different 
sectors that should be selected for our sample. As far as possible, we attempted 
to achieve the same relative proportions of  sectors in our sample as exist- 
according to GUS statistics-in  the population of Warsaw private firms. 
There is one feature of our sample that may seem at first strange. Our sample 
contains  only twenty retail firms but eighty wholesale firms. The reason for 
this is simple-for  some months in 1990, there was available a complete one- 
year  tax  holiday  for anyone registering  to do wholesale  trade as a physical 
person and operating for the first time at a particular address. There is ample 
anecdotal evidence that many people, particularly retailers, were able to take 
advantage of this tax break. 
Interviews were conducted by native Polish speakers, coordinated by MCR 
Research. Some firms in the sample were phoned at random to check that the 
interviewer had actually been there. These interviewers were experienced sub- 
contractors of MCR Research and were instructed to ask follow-up questions 
when an answer was unclear and to build rapport with the interviewee-partic- 
ularly with a view to extracting financial information. 289  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
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Discussion Summary 
Kulmun Mizsei suggested that Johnson had exaggerated the contrast between 
the development paths of the Polish and the Hungarian private sectors. First, 
Mizsei said that, like Poland, Hungary recorded a dramatic boom in private- 
sector growth at the end of the 1980s. He noted that, by 1988, only 450 limited- 
liability firms had been established in Hungary; by  1991, 41,000 such firms 
were incorporated. Second, Mizsei emphasized that, like Hungary, Poland had 
a long history of liberalization under Communist rule. He cited the economic 
liberalization following the 1981 Polish political crisis, and he mentioned the 
prevalence of Polish “trade tourism” and employment abroad during the 1970s. 
Third, Mizsei argued that Johnson had overstated the relative importance of 
unincorporated  private enterprises  in Poland. However, Mizsei did highlight 
one area in which the Polish  and Hungarian  experiences have substantially 
differed. He noted that, under Communist rule, the second economy in Hun- 
gary had been oriented toward production, in contrast to the speculative focus 
of black market activity during Communist rule in Poland (e.g., illegal trade 
in foreign currency). 
Mizsei discussed several financial issues that pertain to Hungary. He noted 
that lax bankruptcy laws have enabled private entrepreneurs to strip the assets 
of bankrupt firms. He suggested that Hungary’s policy of giving preferential 
credits to individuals who purchase  state assets generates pricing distortions 
and raises the likelihood of corruption. Finally, he said that the banking sector 
is taking an increasing interest in attracting deposits from and making loans to 
the private sector. He said that credits to the private sector represent 30 percent 
of the total credit in the portfolios of Hungary’s three largest banks. He argued 
that the general issue of financial intermediation had received too little atten- 
tion at the conference. 
Mizsei also described the status of  the Hungarian privatization  agency, the 291  Private Business in Eastern Europe 
SPA. He said that, in  1991, the SPA reported $40 billion of foreign-currency 
sales, with $35 billion  coming from foreign investors. He noted that,  in re- 
sponse to political pressure  to get a fair price for state assets, the  SPA has 
insisted on sale prices that are often too high to attract any buyers. Finally, he 
said that the SPA has not finalized any of the privatization deals that the agency 
has initiated itself. He said that most of the deals that have been completed 
were initiated by  state enterprise managers. 
Mark Schaffer said that Johnson had not acknowledged the important role 
that the privatization  of  small-scale enterprises had played in the growth of 
Polish private-sector  employment. He noted that, in  1990, the private sector 
recorded a net increase of over 500,000 jobs. Approximately 400,000 of these 
jobs appeared in private firms in the trade sector. At the same time, jobs in the 
socialized trade  sector fell by 400,000, a one-third decrease for that sector. 
Schaffer concluded that these large employment shifts occurred because of the 
government’s emphasis on privatizing small shops in the retail trade sector. 
Lev  Freinkman and Jan Winiecki supported Mizsei’s argument that Johnson 
had exaggerated the contrasts between the paths of private-sector development 
in Poland and in Hungary. Winiecki noted that, in 1989, the last year of Com- 
munist rule, both Poland and Hungary recorded that employees of private firms 
accounted for 10 percent of total employment in the industrial sector. Winiecki 
also provided  some details about the program of  small-scale privatization  in 
Poland. He noted that the term privatization is misleading since 98 percent of 
the firms were not sold but rather leased. He said that this has generated per- 
verse incentives with regard to the maintenance of the leased assets. 
Simon Johnson conceded that he may have overstated the contrasts between 
private-sector  development in Poland and Hungary, but he argued that there 
were important differences. He agreed with Winiecki that the private sectors 
in the two countries looked remarkably similar in 1989. Johnson noted, how- 
ever, that the two countries were very different in 1985, when Hungary had a 
strong second economy and the private sector in Poland was small and was not 
developing. Johnson suggested that Hungary’s 1989 boom in limited-liability 
companies probably was driven by state-owned capital, not private entrepre- 
neurs; the minimum capital required to start such a firm was roughly equivalent 
to $20,000. At the same time, it took only $5.00 to form a joint-stock company 
in Poland. Finally, Johnson argued that much of the Hungarian private-sector 
growth in the late  1980s reflected  legalization of already-existing activities, 
while in Poland this source of growth was less important. During this period, 
Poland experienced more of an actual change in the level of private-sector par- 
ticipation. This Page Intentionally Left Blank